Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level
From: "Paul D. Robertson" <paul () compuwar net>
Date: Tue, 20 Jul 2004 14:40:22 -0400 (EDT)
On Tue, 20 Jul 2004, Chuck Swiger wrote:
There exists a multitude of reasons, agreed. To the extent that the reasons are valid and relevant to the situation at hand, then having a policy which reflects these per-user concerns is reasonable.
Thanks, I was a little worried by what seemed initially to be a "let them all eat cake!" security policy. [snip]
ACK!! For shame, Paul! :-) The right way to think about this is that there should be zero people who have the Administrator password, and only the simple necessity of needing to login as admin for the machine once in a while means that somebody-- hopefully an admin who cares about security-- has to know what the password is.
That was a "Heck, if they can all do what any of them can do" illustration- I just like to illustrate with blunt force trauma.
For that matter, MacOS X does a pretty good job of "not having an admin passord or root user at all" for a Unix-derived operating system. Recommending sudo by default and also providing reasonable integration of re-asking the user to type in a password to obtain privileges when running the GUI package installer or system patch tool beats the heck out of most alternatives in terms of security.
I'm not sure that's all that true. I can probably get root on OSX relatively easily if I need it (I enable it on my laptop anyway) the real key is to stop from being vulnerable, and Apple needs to be a bit quicker on updates and a bit more open about communication (I tried to find out if OSX was vulnerable to a BSD stack issue a while back and got *nowhere*.
If Windows made components downloaded in IE bring up a password dialog before installing/running them, that platform's security would suck less than it currently does. But I could be wrong about this, too: some people seem to think that a web browser which auto-downloads and runs plugins without asking for user confirmation just because you got emailed a link is fine and dandy and user-friendly and all. [3]
There'd be a "Save my password" checkbox anyway...
[1]: Perhaps I am biased towards concluding that "per-user firewall stuff isn't worth the cost", but if so, that bias is towards being too safe, and is thus more tolerable than being biased towards poor security. I don't really trust Microsoft's ISA Server to be secure on the box itself, much less offer per-user firewall capabilities that I would choose to rely on over PF/IPFW.
As I said, I wouldn't use it as a primary device, but the per-application permissioning stuff looks really interesting.
[2]: Does anyone evaluate security products in terms of their security anymore, rather than their claimed feature set and performance?
Yes. Our ICSALabs certifications don't include GUIs, performance or number of checkboxes...
Maybe the kindly vendor hosting their mailing list has some opinions, but there's a certain amount of pay-to-play with their certifications that's not so different from the ISO-17799 consultants and certifications we were just talking about in a parallel thread. [ Not trying to pick on anybody, but fair is fair... ]
I've looked at the Labs programs, some of them in a fair amount of detail, and I've contributed my .02 cents here and there. I think, for the most part, they're a good measure of "must be this functional to play in this space." I certainly wouldn't pick anything that didn't pass our criteria in AV, Firewall or IPSec (those are the programs I'm most familiar with) without significant trust[1.] Sure, there's pay-to-play and it can equate to "the only ones getting rich are the consultants" - except, we're not getting rich off of it, and the state of the art is better for it- I'd be happy to ramble on, but it's probably not appropriate on-list, given that I get to choose what gets posted ;) Paul [1] My home firewall isn't a certified product. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Paul D. Robertson "My statements in this message are personal opinions paul () compuwar net which may have no basis whatsoever in fact." probertson () trusecure com Director of Risk Assessment TruSecure Corporation _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () honor icsalabs com http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Santos (Jul 19)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Luca Berra (Jul 19)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Devdas Bhagat (Jul 19)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Paul D. Robertson (Jul 19)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Chuck Swiger (Jul 19)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Paul D. Robertson (Jul 19)
- Re: Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Steve Lam (Jul 20)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Chuck Swiger (Jul 20)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Paul D. Robertson (Jul 20)
- Re: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Paul D. Robertson (Jul 19)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- RE: Firewalling at the domain users level instead of network level Melson, Paul (Jul 19)
