
Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration
From: "Sanford Reed" <sanford.reed () cox net>
Date: Wed, 4 May 2005 00:49:23 -0400
On Sunday, May 01, 2005 1:14 AM, Jason Gomes asked: What is the preferred placement for a OWA front-end server given these two possible network configurations and why? Setup 1) [Internet] <==> [PIX Firewall] <==> [ISA Proxy] <==> [PIX Firewall] <==> [OWA] <==> [Internal Net w/Exchange Svr] Setup 2) [Internet] <==> [PIX Firewall] <==> [ISA Proxy] <==> [OWA] <==> [PIX Firewall] <==> [Internal Net w/Exchange Svr] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ben I don't think we are that far apart because I agree 100% with the need to protect the OWA box with as many controls as possible. In Setup 1, we have: 1. Placed 2 FWs between the OWA box and the uncontrolled Internet 2. Restricted access to the ISA via FW-1 ACLs. 3. Restricted (Filtered) the required access to the OWA box to only HTTPS by two devices. ISA & FW-2 4. Restricted the HTTPS access to only 'validated' domain addresses via the ISA ACLs. I have always taken the position that if a Hacker gains access to one box on at network subnet than he has the ability to gain access to all on that subnet. I.E. in setup 2 - if he 'cracks' either the ISA OR the OWA then he gains a map of that subnet and therefore can work on cracking the other boxes there. Either from the box he already 'controls' or because he now 'knows' the direct IP of the other boxes he can attack them directly. From there he can move on to the next gateway device, etc, etc..... Because in these cases he specifically stated that: Notes: The ISA server is performing a reverse proxy for HTTPS connections. In #1, the backend firewall will only allow port 443 through to OWA. In #2, all ports required for OWA to communicate with the internal Exchange server is allowed. Setup 1 gives the 'best' option by having: 1. Configure the ISA Server exist as a stand alone box with 'no contact' to the internal network by having it in its on domain that is NOT part of the internal Active Directory (AD) tree. 2. Configuring the ISA Box to strictly passing any inbound traffic only to the OWA interface via HTTPS thru the 'internal firewall. 3. Set the ISA box to restrict the HTTPS traffic to sources from a 'validated' domain addresses. 4. Set the FWs with very restricted inbound ACLs to support the ISA configuration. He could also use the ISA to 'filter' outbound Internet access based on various factors such as 'bad word' lists or prohibited domains. If he tries to do any thing else such as Internet access control based on Active Directory (AD) Security group membership all the rules change. As soon as he does this he will have to open the AD Replication/Access ports to support that access control thus making the situation almost as bad as putting the OWA Server between the two firewalls. In that case I would have to rethink the whole setup. You are correct with the lock down of the Dynamic RPC ports. Cisco has a 'white paper' that discusses which ports to allow supporting 'limited' access to AD thru a PIX. By moving the OWA behind FW-2 and restricting access via only HTTPS we have reduced the 'exposure' to the minimum possible risk level. But I'm starting to ramble so I'll stop here. I hope you now understand my reasoning for picking Setup 1. -----Original Message----- From: Ben Nagy [mailto:ben () iagu net] Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 1:46 PM To: sanford.reed () reed-assoc-llc com Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration OK, in that case we're on different planets. Any architecture with no controls between the (as you say) hackable OWA box and the Internal network is not one I'd subscribe to. I've done all this before too, but a long time ago. Back then you could lock down the dynamic RPC ports to a smallish range and so it was only the SMB/CIFS/AD traffic to the domain controller to really fret about. Oh well. Cheers! ben
-----Original Message----- From: Sanford Reed [mailto:sanford.reed () cox net] Sent: Tuesday, May 03, 2005 6:18 PM To: 'Ben Nagy' Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration I'm for Pix <=> ISA <=> PIX <=> Internal network (with OWA, etc)
[...]
-----Original Message----- From: Ben Nagy [mailto:ben () iagu net]
[...]
Would adding a firewall to [2] between ISA and OWA make you happy? In other words, maybe we're arguing about the lesser of two evils... ben-----Original Message----- From: Sanford Reed [mailto:sanford.reed () cox net]
[...]
I'm actually assuming that the OWA box is more hackable
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Current thread:
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration, (continued)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Mark Tinberg (May 05)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Paul Melson (May 02)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Danny (May 05)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Jason Gomes (May 03)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Paul Melson (May 03)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Kevin (May 05)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Jason Gomes (May 05)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Frank Knobbe (May 05)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Paul Melson (May 03)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Thomas W Shinder (May 05)
- FW: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Paul Melson (May 05)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Sanford Reed (May 05)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Jason Gomes (May 05)
- PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration woodsd001 (May 05)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Paul Melson (May 05)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Michael Brown (May 08)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Mark Tinberg (May 08)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Victor Williams (May 08)
- Re: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Chris Blask (May 12)
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Paul Melson (May 05)
- Message not available
- RE: PIX -> ISA -> OWA Configuration Chris Blask (May 17)