IDS mailing list archives

RE: False Positives


From: "Fergus Brooks" <fergusb () evolve-online com>
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2003 11:47:58 +0800


10 cents:

There isn't an IDS system that will not report "false positives"
regardless of the definition. While selling IDS systems we use tools
like the excellent IDS Informer to prove the concept. Being as these
tools are not actually attacking but testing, and they report an attack,
then they are generating a *false positive*

I believe this thread was about eliminating them, whatever they are, and
this is the crucial thing that my customers ask me and also my key
interest when looking at products to recommend. 

Any IDS system that issues a huge amount of unimportant alerts becomes a
larger danger to an organisation than no IDS at all. This is because the
business will say they have an IDS however the alerts (good, bad,
irrelevant) are not monitored because 99 times out of 100 (being
generous...) they are rubbish.

In our region (Asia) I would go as far as to say that 95% of the IDS
systems that are implemented are not delivering.

Event correlation is a start - baselining, correlation, and consistent
tweaking and analysis are, IMHO, the best way to eliminate *false
positives*

Always looking for better ways though?



-----Original Message-----
From: Steven Richards [mailto:srichards () netscreen com] 
Sent: Thursday, 5 June 2003 4:19 AM
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Cc: 'Harshul Nayak (ealcatraz)'; Andi Hess
Subject: RE: False Positives


 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

<insert standard vendor disclaimer here>

I would like to offer up a couple of definitions of terms for
discussion.

We in the security space, more specifically the IDS/P space should agree
on some standard language.


In my opinion, these terms should be considered:

False Positive=   Sensor is supposed to be looking for 'xyz' and what
actually goes across the wire is 'abc' which generates an alert.

Non-Security Event=   Sensor is looking for 'XXX' it sees 'XXX' go
over the wire, *but* it is not an actual "Security Event" because the
corporate security policy and/or the system configurations are
intentionally not configured to disallow 'XXX'.  For example: you
configure your systems to allow Null Login NetBIOS Sessions (for
whatever reason) and your corporate security policies do not disallow
this.  The sensor sees this traffic and it generates an alert.  It
actually happened on your network.  It's just that you don't *care*
about it.




-----Original Message-----
From: Harshul Nayak (ealcatraz) [mailto:harshul () ealcatraz com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 04, 2003 1:11 PM
To: Andi Hess
Cc: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: False Positives


Hello Andi,

It's quite often many people use the term "false positive"
for the tests
conducted by you,
With due respect to all, would like to share with reference 
to the article
by Marcus J. Ranum for ICSA Labs IDSC :

Your mail is referring to :

* False Attack Stimulus - A stimulus that causes an IDS to
trigger an alarm
when no actual exploited attack has
occurred. False attack stimuli generate false positives; and 
are frequently
seen during badly designed IDS tests or
when attackers attempt to overload an IDS' alert processing 
capability using
a tool such as Stick. Many scanning
tools generate false attack stimuli. For example, if a
vulnerability assessment tool connects to a web server and
issues a "GET" for a known-vulnerable CGI-bin script, it is 
not the same
thing as when a hacking tool connects and
exercises the complete attack via the same script.
Depending on the application protocols in use it may be 
difficult for the
IDS to distinguish a stimulus that looks for a
vulnerability from a stimulus that actually triggers a 
compromise in the
system. False attack stimuli are deliberately
used in some IDS testing regimens, attempting to verify the 
IDS' function
without placing real systems at risk. When
testing IDS a tester should mix a number of false attack 
stimuli with true
attack stimuli.

Here is the definition of "false positive"
* False Positive - An alarm generated by an IDS in which the
IDS alerts to a
condition that is actually benign. In
other words, the IDS made a mistake. A typical example of a 
false positive
would be a case when an IDS raises a
"SYN flood" alarm because it sees a large number of SYN 
packets directed at
a busy web server and mistakenly
concludes it is under attack. Another example of a false 
positive would be
an IDS raising a "SMTP Wiz attack" alarm
when it observes the string "DEBUG" in the body of an SMTP message.

hope this helps you.

-regs
Harshul
Copyright C 2002 Sintelli
http://www.sintelli.com
----------------------------------------------------------------
"A good listener is usually thinking about something else."

-----Original Message-----
From: Andi Hess [mailto:andi_hess () web de]
Sent: Tuesday, June 03, 2003 4:13 PM
To: focus-ids () securityfocus com
Subject: False Positives




Hi there,

I am new in the field of NIDS and I wonder if the
problem of false positives is really this huge as
mentioned in several publications.

I am considering tools like PCP, Stick (I have never
seen them, but read about them) which can be used to
generate huge amount of packets and each on triggers an
alarm on the victim IDS (a false positive, as the
packets are not a real attack).
As it has been impossible for me to find any of the
above mentioned packet generators - I wonder how the
packets look like?
Is it possible to differentiate 'artifically' generated
false positives from natural ones?

Any hint is welcome!

Thank you.

A.




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INTRUSION PREVENTION: READY FOR PRIME TIME?

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analysis 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTRUSION PREVENTION: READY FOR PRIME TIME?

IntruShield now offers unprecedented Intrusion IntelligenceTM capabilities 
- including intrusion identification, relevancy, direction, impact and analysis 
- enabling a path to prevention.

Download the latest white paper "Intrusion Prevention: Myths, Challenges, and Requirements" at: 
http://www.securityfocus.com/IntruVert-focus-ids2
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