IDS mailing list archives
Re: Network hardware IPS
From: Darren Bolding <darren () faucet net>
Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2003 22:21:50 +0000
Travis, My company recently evaluated a couple of IDS/IDP(etc) products, and decided to implement the Netscreen IDP's. We deployed them in multiple locations and have been quite happy. During testing, I ran various tests against the IDP's and a few other vendors products. In particular, I used Nessus as a typical baseline. An example test was to place my collection of desktops and non-production servers behind an IDP-100 in bridge mode. I then enabled the IDP to drop packets (I also experimented with sending RST's as appropriate) and went about normal use for a week or so. No problems (and this was dropping all critical and "high" importance attacks) were experienced by myself or others using the servers. Then, I ran Nessus against the servers without the IDP dropping packets, and with it dropping packets (attacks). In the first case (no blocking) given that I had set things up intentionally insecure, Nessus found ~75 vulnerabilities. Then I turned packet/attack dropping on and re-ran the test. That test revealed something like 8 "vulnerabilities" which were all of the vaguest sort- "Your running a webserver/ftp server", "You have IIS running, thats bad!" etc. No real attacks. I know that Nessus and other scanners don't by any means include the universe of attacks- but it was a decent baseline in my view. A comparison to a major routing vendors IDS that we tested was favorable to Netscreen. While both systems detected the attacks, when in "protect" mode, the major vendor would issue shun/block commands to a firewall- Nessus found a number more vulnerabilities in that case. A system that controls other systems has to react to what it sees- that makes it hard, if not impossible, to catch that first packet. There are plenty of single-packet vulnerabilities out there. The logging is excellent, the gui is very nice, and the attack database was better than other products I had seen (handy links to Bugtraq/CVE id's). As a customer, support has been fast and effective- and yes, there have been issues that required support. If you aren't a UNIX person, these may be more significant. To me, they were more "duh, I should have known that" issues. Updates are every Thursday (and emergencies) and seem to be informative. We run a lot of protocols on non-standard ports, and can charachterize inoccent traffic fairly well in certain areas. The ability to apply signatures to non-standard ports, and to write custom signatures is significant. Perhaps the most useful feature I found was the highly context sensitive signatures- I can write signatures that check for a particular string in an ftp username for example. Since the rules are ordered, and can be terminal or non-terminal, that makes it possible to alarm on any userid except for a specific one (just an example, we don't do this). All in all, the product was good, and the support has been great. I value the sales/SE experience and find that it frequently corelates with how seriously a company will support you. Other than the dearth of swag, the Netscreen SE and reseller were excellent. I suspect you would get the same SE given your location. So, yes, we're quite happy with it, both in testing and in production. --D On Mon, Sep 29, 2003 at 12:55:47PM -0700, travis.alexander () lacamas org wrote:
Has anyone had any personal experience with the NetScreen IDP products? Does it live up the hype that is stated on their website? Does it truly work that way they say? Thanks in advance for replies. Travis Alexander Network Administrator Lacamas Community Credit Union 360-834-3611 http://www.lacamas.org -----Original Message----- From: JAVIER OTERO [mailto:jotero () SMARTEKH com] Sent: Monday, September 29, 2003 9:02 AM To: Alvin Wong; focus-ids () securityfocus com Subject: RE: Network hardware IPS Netscreen IDP is a good product, uses 8 mechanisms for detect, 3 models, small, medium and large, 3 active modes plu 1 passive (like IDS) Ing. Fco. Javier Otero De Alba Diplomado en Seguridad Inform?tica ITESM CEM Grupo Smartekh Antivirus Expertos Bussiness Continuity Inftegrity 5243-4782 al 84 Ext.300 M?xico, D.F. -----Mensaje original----- De: Alvin Wong [mailto:alvin.wong () b2b com my] Enviado el: Lunes, 29 de Septiembre de 2003 03:31 a.m. Para: focus-ids () securityfocus com Asunto: Network hardware IPS Hi, I'm interested to find out if anyone can share their experiences or recommend a network hardware IPS that is deployed in front of the gateway which is able to detect attack signatures and at the same time, actively blocking out these attacks, alerting me in the process. This would be different from a passive IDS which depends on correlating the logs every time an alert pops up. An ideal solution would be to be able to detect the patterns and prevent them automatically, can a network IPS do this? I understand that it is possible in some IDS to do a TCP reset after one had confirmed that the connection is not acceptable, can anyone explain whether an IDS that can do this be actually "active" as opposed to passive? It would also be interesting if there could be some amount of trend analysis built in which can review the destination/source ip traffic over time, which can be used to identify particular boxes which are easily targeted, which would mean that more work needs to be done for that box. Regards, Alvin --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Captus Networks IPS 4000 Intrusion Prevention and Traffic Shaping Technology to: - Instantly Stop DoS/DDoS Attacks, Worms & Port Scans - Automatically Control P2P, IM and Spam Traffic - Precisely Define and Implement Network Security & Performance Policies FREE Vulnerability Assessment Toolkit - WhitePapers - Live Demo http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CaptusNetworks_focus-ids_000101 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Captus Networks IPS 4000 Intrusion Prevention and Traffic Shaping Technology to: - Instantly Stop DoS/DDoS Attacks, Worms & Port Scans - Automatically Control P2P, IM and Spam Traffic - Precisely Define and Implement Network Security & Performance Policies FREE Vulnerability Assessment Toolkit - WhitePapers - Live Demo http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CaptusNetworks_focus-ids_000101 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Captus Networks IPS 4000 Intrusion Prevention and Traffic Shaping Technology to: - Instantly Stop DoS/DDoS Attacks, Worms & Port Scans - Automatically Control P2P, IM and Spam Traffic - Precisely Define and Implement Network Security & Performance Policies FREE Vulnerability Assessment Toolkit - WhitePapers - Live Demo http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CaptusNetworks_focus-ids_000101 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Captus Networks IPS 4000 Intrusion Prevention and Traffic Shaping Technology to: - Instantly Stop DoS/DDoS Attacks, Worms & Port Scans - Automatically Control P2P, IM and Spam Traffic - Precisely Define and Implement Network Security & Performance Policies FREE Vulnerability Assessment Toolkit - WhitePapers - Live Demo http://www.securityfocus.com/sponsor/CaptusNetworks_focus-ids_000101 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- RE: Network hardware IPS Davis, Scott L (Oct 02)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Stefano Zanero (Oct 06)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: Network hardware IPS Darren Bolding (Oct 02)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Alvin Wong (Oct 02)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Ravi Kumar (Oct 02)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Alvin Wong (Oct 02)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Ravi Kumar (Oct 06)
- RE: Network hardware IPS Ron Gula (Oct 02)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Gary Flynn (Oct 06)
- Re: Network hardware IPS david maynor (Oct 07)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Gary Flynn (Oct 08)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Gary Flynn (Oct 06)
- RE: Network hardware IPS Dave Killion (Oct 07)
- Re: Network hardware IPS Stefano Zanero (Oct 07)
