IDS mailing list archives

Re: Wired detection of rogue access points


From: tim_holman () hotmail com
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2007 15:20:47 +0000

Granted that mac filtering keeps crap out but bear in mind the REAL threat is not accidental users of your network but 
more so intelligent criminals who will go straight for the kill with a spoofed mac, pick up a dhcp address, then mine 
your data by further penetrating your applications.
Is mac filtering an effective layer of security?  Or is it just another administrative burden that gives your boss 
better qos by ensuring unauthorised users are not borrowing your network?
Am just trying to promote thought outside the box here - anyone intent on getting access to your network via wireless 
is not going to simply plug in a linksys AP and set alarm bells ringing - they are very likely to use a custom AP with 
spoofed mac or try and install a usb AP on an existing device in order to conceal their tracks.

Rgds

Tim
 
Sent from my BlackBerry® wireless device  

-----Original Message-----
From: Adam Powers <apowers () lancope com>
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2007 10:40:53 
To:<tim_holman () hotmail com>,Adam Graham <agraham () datastreamcowboys net>,<listbounce () securityfocus 
com>,"Focus-Ids@Securityfocus. Com" <focus-ids () securityfocus com>
Subject: Re: Wired detection of rogue access points

"Filtering by MAC gives you no additional security whatsoever, period"

Meh, this is simply not true. My home AP might is plenty secure from my SOHO
technology noob neighbors with MAC filtering - few, if any, of them even
know what an "AP" is much less "MAC spoofing".

Having said that filtering technologies such as MAC filtering are far too
difficult to manage given the relatively small security return provided and
as such should be avoided given the fact that other superior authentication
and access control mechanisms exist.



On 3/26/07 7:24 PM, "tim_holman () hotmail com" <tim_holman () hotmail com> wrote:

Filtering by MAC gives you no additional security whatsoever, period.  MAC
addresses can be easily spoofed and although your solution may assist in
spotting misconfigurations a determined intruder will get straight through....

Sent from my BlackBerry® wireless device

-----Original Message-----
From: "Adam Graham" <agraham () datastreamcowboys net>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2007 15:52:21
To:<focus-ids () securityfocus com>
Subject: RE: Wired detection of rogue access points

First off is it even possible to buy a laptop that does not have wifi built
in?

I have set up an automated scan looking for MACs. If the MAC does not appear
on my list I drop its packets in the IPTabes FW. It's rather simple to do.
The main thing I do that seems to work the best is the APs are un-trusted
and therefore stuck out in the DMZ. Before one can get to network resources
they need to open the VPN client after connecting to the AP.

A simple way to handle MACs with IPTables (NOTE: simple rule if you need
more instruction I can send it to you or just the complete iptable script):

Let's create 2 text files:
/tmp/whiteist
/tmp/blackist

Insert into whiteist  00:06:25:2E:56:A0
Insert into blackist  00:06:25:2E:56:E1


Add following to your IPTabes script
TABLES = "filter nat mangle"
iptables = /sbin/iptables
touch /tmp/whiteist
touch /tmp/blackist
WHITELIST = `cat /tmp/whiteist | awk '{print $1}'
BLACKLIST = `cat /tmp/blackist | awk '{print $1}'

# Forward good MACs
$iptables -t filter -I FORWARD 1 -m mark --mark 0x42 -j ACCEPT

# mark all packets from the good macs
for MAC in $WHITELIST ; do
$iptables -t mangle -I PREROUTING -m mac --mac-source $MAC -j MARK
--set-mark 0x42
done

# drop all packets from the good macs
for MAC in $BLACKLIST ; do
$iptables -t mangle -I PREROUTING -m mac --mac-source $MAC -j DROP
done





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-- 

Adam  Powers
Chief Technology Officer
Lancope, Inc.
c. 678.725.1028
e. adam () lancope com


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