IDS mailing list archives
Re: IDS detection approaches
From: Gary Halleen <ghalleen () cisco com>
Date: Fri, 05 Oct 2007 16:51:08 -0700
Frank, This is an unfair, and inaccurate, generalization on Cisco IPS. I can't speak for ISS or Juniper, but assume the same there. Since Cisco IDS 4.1, verbose alert information has been available, and is part of the alert (when enabled). In 4.1, this was referred to as TriggerPacket data, and now is called Verbose Alert. A Cisco verbose alert contains all information normally existing in an IDS/IPS alert, as well as a PCAP of the packet that triggered the alert. You can analyze this packet in whichever tool you prefer, just as if you'd captured it with tcpdump. Over the last several years, Cisco has had a great track record of releasing new signatures in a very short time period when new threats are discovered. Since January 1, 2006, there have been 92 signature updates. When new threats (especially dangerous threats), a new signature update is released in a very short time -- sometimes hours. Additionally, all Cisco IPS signatures are open. You are able to view all or most fields of signatures, create your own, and modify existing signatures. You do not need to wait for Cisco to release new signatures if you have sufficient IDS/IPS skills to write a new signature. If you can write a snort rule, you can write a Cisco IPS signature. Gary On 10/4/07 7:29 PM, "frankfrydrych () gmail com" <frankfrydrych () gmail com> wrote:
Hola, I would completely go with a signature based IDS. Anomaly based IDS will not give you the greatest results. For signature base I highly recommend SNORT. It is probably one of the best IDS out there. Now I'm not just saying this as a "ooh open source is the best". I truely believe this. I actually use to be a huge Cisco buff and just dealt with Cisco IDS. However, at my current job I am a security analyst and have to analyze events from Cisco, IIS, Juniper, etc, and SNORT beats them all. Mainly for the fact that you are able to see the packet payload and are able to make the decision if something is malicious based on the actual payload and not just the signature that is triggered (like some IDS). Also, when a new threat emerges usually SNORT users will create a signature to combat the threat. The other vendors create the signatures for you and it usually ends up to be like 3 months after the threat was actually a realistic threat. And on top of it the vendor signatures usually give out huge amount of false positves. Then again, an IDS is only as good as who tunes it. If you take A NY IDS and turn it on in a production network you will have so many false positives I garuntee you will miss actual threats. Every IDS (including SNORT) has to be tuned for the production network it is on. Finally, make sure to place the IDS behind the firewall. If you place it in front of the firewall you will receive so much traffic that it is just not valuable data. You have a firewall, so let the firewall do its job and block the already known bad activity, and catch what gets through the firewall with a IDS. -FF ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.coresecurity.com/index.php5?module=Form&action=impact&campaign=intr o_sfw to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Hacker only has to be right once... Stay Secure! Gary Halleen, CISSP ISSAP, CHP Consulting Security Engineer Western Area Security Team Cisco Systems 5300 SW Meadows Road, Suite 300 Lake Oswego OR 97035 (503) 598-7134 Author, Security Monitoring with CS-MARS, ISBN: 1587052709 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Test Your IDS Is your IDS deployed correctly? Find out quickly and easily by testing it with real-world attacks from CORE IMPACT. Go to http://www.coresecurity.com/index.php5?module=Form&action=impact&campaign=intro_sfw to learn more. ------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current thread:
- IDS detection approaches snort user (Oct 04)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Srinivasa Addepalli (Oct 05)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Campa, Albert R. (Oct 05)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Stefano Zanero (Oct 10)
- Re: IDS detection approaches p1g (Oct 15)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: IDS detection approaches frankfrydrych (Oct 05)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Gary Halleen (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Randal T. Rioux (Oct 12)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Gary Halleen (Oct 12)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Gary Halleen (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches jean-philippe luiggi (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Adam Powers (Oct 09)
- RE: IDS detection approaches 'Merigoth' (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Liran Cohen (Oct 15)
- Oracle XDB FTP Kanagasingham, Prathaben (Oct 26)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Nelson Brito (Oct 09)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Sec urity (Oct 09)
- RE: IDS detection approaches Nelson Brito (Oct 10)
- Re: IDS detection approaches Sec urity (Oct 09)
