Re: [Apparmor-dev] Re: Re: [SC-L] Re: [Owasp-dotnet] RE: 4 Questions:Latest IE vulnerability, Firefox vs IE security, User vs Admin risk profile, and browsers coded in 100% Managed Verifiable code

[Seth Arnold <seth.arnold () suse de>]

On Thu, Apr 06, 2006 at 12:01:06PM -0400, Brian Eaton wrote:
> Does cap_setuid give a program enough authority to break out of the
> AppArmor profile?

Not directly, no; however, because a process with this capability can
forge credentials over unix domain sockets it is possible that it could
entice another process on the system to perform operations on its behalf
that the receiving process wouldn't ordinarily allow.

And, of course, just granting the capability in our profile language isn't
sufficient -- we simply restrict the capabilities that the process may
use -- the process would need to receive the cap_setuid bit from some other
process in order to be able to use setuid(2), forge credentials, etc.

More dangerous to grant would be CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_MODULE,
CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_SYS_RAWIO. Of course you only have to grant
these capabilities to processes that require the functionality these
capabilities allow -- if you don't need the functionality, then you do
not need to grant the capabilities.

Thanks

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