Re: Downloads Folder: A Binary Planting Minefield

[Nate Theis <nttheis () gmail com>]

Hmm, interesting AV evasion technique: Seemingly legitimate app, but the
download page gives both a malicious DLL and the main executable, the main
executable uses LoadLibrary insecurely.
On Feb 22, 2012 9:33 AM, "ACROS Security Lists" <lists () acros si> wrote:

> Hi Jeff,
>
> > I don't believe a PE/PE+ executable needs a DLL extension to
> > be loaded by LoadLibrary and friends.
>
> True, any file can be loaded this way, but our pretty extensive
> experimenting showed
> extremely few cases where legitimate applications (in this case mostly
> installers)
> loaded anything other than <something>.dll. The operating assumption here
> is that the
> initial executable (installer) is friendly but whatever it loads with
> LoadLibrary*
> can be potentially malicious. The attacker can therefore not choose which
> file the
> initial executable will load with LoadLibrary* but must plant a file that
> the
> executable is already set to load.
>
> > Perhaps a scanning/cleansing tool would be helpful.
>
> Certainly. In the mean time, "del Downloads\*" is a free and efficient
> superset of
> that ;-)
>
> Cheers,
> Mitja
>
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