Intrusion Detection Systems mailing list archives
Re: a novice question.
From: blue0ne () igloo org (Jackie Chan)
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 2000 04:04:37 -0500 (EST)
Archive: http://msgs.securepoint.com/ids FAQ: http://www.ticm.com/kb/faq/idsfaq.html IDS: http://www-rnks.informatik.tu-cottbus.de/~sobirey/ids.html UNSUBSCRIBE: email "unsubscribe ids" to majordomo () uow edu au Raj, Yes it is true that most IDS carry all possible signatures, but the assumption that they are all in effect at one time is undounded and requires clarification. When using an IDS on a network, the administrator of the IDS normally determines what signatures to look for, and what signatures not to look for. Although some may argue that one should look for all signatures to be aware of any attack, my position is that if I turn off for instance PHF attack, knowing that my network does not contain such an old exploit, that I will optimize the IDS. If in the event that someone has placed a vulnerable (and extrememly old) version of apache on my network, it is logical to assume that you will pick up either pre attack probes as well as other attack signatures associated with this attacker. It is highley unlikely that 1. someone decides to place an old version of apache web server on the network, and 2. an attacker would look only for that one particular exploit wihtout first probing around or attacking other resources as well. For those planets to be aligned it takes one heck of an odd probability, a risk that I am ready to assume to allow optimization of an IDS. For further clarification on this matter and other, read the 'Generic IDS considerations' portion of my paper on Shomiti Taps found at http://www.secur-e.com/files/ShomitiTap.pdf Cheers, blue0ne (ok, thats 4 posts to the list in 2 days, I believe I've reached my limit) On Sat, 25 Mar 2000, RajKumar S. wrote:
Archive: http://msgs.securepoint.com/ids FAQ: http://www.ticm.com/kb/faq/idsfaq.html IDS: http://www-rnks.informatik.tu-cottbus.de/~sobirey/ids.html HELP: Having problems... email questions to ids-owner () uow edu au NOTE: Remove this section from reply msgs otherwise the msg will bounce. SPAM: DO NOT send unsolicted mail to this list. UNSUBSCRIBE: email "unsubscribe ids" to majordomo () uow edu au ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- hello all, from all the mails i have been getting here i belive that all the IDS products have all the available attack signatures. ie even if the network that i use do not contain any solaris or NT my IDS s/w will check for all the possible exploits that can be mounted against an nt or solaris. now why is this necessary. since the performance of an IDS system can be improved if the number of attack signature can be reduced. one use of having all the attack sig is that it will be possible to log all the possible attacks that are mounted against my network. but most of the time they do not cause any harm, for eg if i am runnig a server v1.8 and it explicitly fixed a bug found in v1.7, am i required to have the attack sig of the bug which was fixed. what use will that sig be to me pl correct me if i got some ideas wrong raj
Current thread:
- Re: Good source of intrusion detection and response steps? Robert Graham (Mar 24)
- Re: Good source of intrusion detection and response steps? -reply mht () clark net (Mar 24)
- Re: Good source of intrusion detection and response steps? Matt Baney (Mar 24)
- Re: Good source of intrusion detection and response steps? Jackie Chan (Mar 24)
- Re: Good source of intrusion detection and response steps? Philippe Bourgeois (Mar 27)
- IDS for Win2k Martins, Fernando (Lisbon) (Mar 27)
- Re: IDS for Win2k Greg Shipley (Mar 27)
- Re: Good source of intrusion detection and response steps? Jackie Chan (Mar 24)
- a novice question. RajKumar S. (Mar 24)
- Re: a novice question. Jackie Chan (Mar 25)
- Re: a novice question. Stuart Staniford-Chen (Mar 25)
- Re: a novice question. Jackie Chan (Mar 25)
- Intruder Alert Chad Harrington (Mar 25)
- CERT advisories,.. Koriun Margaryan (Mar 28)
- RE: CERT advisories,.. Peter Kelly (Mar 28)
- Re: CERT advisories,.. Cliff Rayman (Mar 28)
- RE: CERT advisories,.. Peter A. Thermos (Mar 28)
- RE: A novice question Talisker (Mar 26)
- Re: a novice question. Stuart Staniford-Chen (Mar 25)
