Intrusion Detection Systems mailing list archives

RE: RE: sequence No.


From: "Bill Royds" <broyds () home com>
Date: Thu, 10 May 2001 21:22:52 -0400

Archive: http://msgs.securepoint.com/ids
FAQ IDS: http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/ID_FAQ.htm
FAQ NIDS: http://www.ticm.com/kb/faq/idsfaq.html
IDS: http://www-rnks.informatik.tu-cottbus.de/~sobirey/ids.html
HELP: Having problems... email questions to ids-owner () uow edu au
NOTE: Remove this section from reply msgs otherwise the msg will bounce.
SPAM: DO NOT send unsolicted mail to this list.
UNSUBSCRIBE: email "unsubscribe ids" to majordomo () uow edu au
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The situation should be that bad routers will also mangle the checksum (despite its feeble uniqueness) so mangled 
packets would be rejected anyway. You would only be building the state for packets with valid information in headers 
and valid checksums. Any packets from a broken router should be rejected out of hand anyway, without worrying about 
whether they are fragments or not. Of course this depends on checksums being a good parity check, which they really 
aren't, but it is al we have for IPv4.

-----Original Message-----
From: Jeff Nathan [mailto:jeff () wwti com]
Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2001 16:26
To: Bill Royds
Cc: Martin Roesch; Greg Shipley; ids () uow edu au
Subject: Re: IDS: RE: sequence No.


I've been thinking this over and I'm wondering if some of this isn't
jumping the gun.  Yesterday during a discussion, someone mentioned to me
the one thing we have been overlooking.  That being, bad hardware can
effect all of this!  A broken router between any two end points could
corrupt any portion of the raw byte stream it's looking at.  At a real
nitty gritty level it doesn't really know about IP, etc.. It might
mangle a random byte or even a few bytes such that an overlap could
occur.

Also, to a degree, it bothers me that a border device would be designed
to violate the RFC standard for handling new fragments w/ overlap.  I
understand what you're getting at, and in the case of a gateway device
that does the work of a firewall but through IDS mechanisms, it would of
course make decisions on what traffic got through and what didn't get
through.  I think that ideally, a gateway device that had both firewall
and IDS functionality would defragment everything properly at the
gateway, etc.  A simple border device might handle overlaps but what
about overlaps w/ options? :P

-Jeff


Current thread: