Security Incidents mailing list archives
Re: ICMP time exceed in-transit packets
From: cbrenton () SOVER NET (Chris Brenton)
Date: Sat, 1 Jan 2000 10:12:19 -0500
"White, Tim" wrote:
I am getting these destined for networks behind my firewall (application gateway), which does not pass ANY ICMP, in or out. They are also destined for 24 bit network addresses (i.e. 172.16.12.0). What is really odd about these is that they are slowly covering my entire class B at early morning hours. They are sourced from about 20 routers covering a broad area.
We've been seeing *a lot* of these over on SANS as well. See: http://www.sans.org/y2k.htm I posted a bit of info on this here a few days ago. Let me give a bit of an update as to what we've found. What appears to be happening is the attacker generates traffic to a remote system but sets the TTL value in the packet to be just a few hops short of what's needed to get there. A majority of the packets are echo-request, but we've seen a few TCP and UDP packets as well. The source address of these packets is spoofed. The value is a .0 address from within the target network's subnet range. So the attacker transmits the above packet. While in transit, the TTL drops to zero. The router receiving the TTL 0 packet realizes it can not forward it and issues a time exceeded (ICMP type 11) packet back to the spoofed source address. So what you are seeing in your logs is the error code generated by the spoofed packets when the TTL expires. A couple of odd things about this traffic pattern: The type 11 packets are small, requiring *many* to be an effective DoS The type 11's are actually smaller than the packets needed to generate them. ;) Target subnets always seem to be class A and B networks Spoofed IP address always seems to be x.x.x.0 All "sets" of attacks on a particular subnet appear to originate from a single host There are actually very few hosts performing this attack pattern I think the whole idea of this attack is its suppose to be "stealthy" and cause confusion. The source of the type 11's are multiple backbone routers from around the Internet. This makes it appear as multiple hosts are launching a coordinated attack. If you track back the IP address, people may become additional concerned if they think one of these routers have been compromised. So how to track it? One of the nice things about this traffic pattern is that its pretty lame as far as DoS attacks go. The attacker needs to generate a packet for every packet seen by the target network (and as mentioned above, a bigger one at that). I think the idea was that transmitting to x.x.x.0 would perform some from of amplification on the target network itself, but I have yet to see a single person report this. They may also be attempting to leverage the fact that many filtering firewalls allow type 11 packets into the internal network. Now, if you can decode the type 11 packets you are seeing, they will include the first 64 bits of the original packet transmitted by the attacker. This means you now know the IP address of the destination within the echo-request packet as well as the IP address of the router issuing the type 11. Drawing a straight line back brings you to the major provider where the attack originated. In fact I'm seeing that the attacker's attempt to randomize the number of routers issuing the type 11's actually helps in triangulating their location. Now its just a matter of using something like MCI's DosTracker to ID the offending system. Of course none of this would be a problem if we all did ingress filtering, but I will not go there... ;) Cheers, Chris -- ************************************** cbrenton () sover net * Multiprotocol Network Design & Troubleshooting http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0782120822/geekspeaknet * Mastering Network Security http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0782123430/geekspeaknet
Current thread:
- Re: ICMP time exceed in-transit packets White, Tim (Dec 31)
- Re: ICMP time exceed in-transit packets Chris Brenton (Jan 01)
- Re: ICMP time exceed in-transit packets Alain Thivillon (Jan 01)
- Re: ICMP time exceed in-transit packets Christopher Wilson (Jan 02)
- port 119 Dariusz Zmokly (Jan 03)
- Re: port 119 Robert Graham (Jan 03)
- Re: port 119 Thomas Molina (Jan 04)
- Re: port 119 Vince Vielhaber (Jan 05)
- Re: ICMP time exceed in-transit packets Alain Thivillon (Jan 01)
- Ports 25092 / 20869 Vanja Hrustic (Jan 04)
- Re: Ports 25092 / 20869 Robert Graham (Jan 04)
- port 1150 and 4833 ? Kim R. Rasmussen (Jan 04)
- Re: port 1150 and 4833 ? Frameloss, Frameloss (Jan 10)
- Re: ICMP time exceed in-transit packets Chris Brenton (Jan 01)
