Security Incidents mailing list archives

Re: [RHSA-2000:039-02] remote root exploit (SITE EXEC) fixed (fwd)


From: aleph1 () SECURITYFOCUS COM (Elias Levy)
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2000 10:25:02 -0700


Message-ID: <B17EB7B34580D311BE38525405DF623225F0AD () atc-mail-db atctraining com au>
From: Tony Langdon <tlangdon () atctraining com au>
To: 'wayout' <wayout () WAYOUT IAE NL>, BUGTRAQ () SECURITYFOCUS COM
Subject: RE: [RHSA-2000:039-02] remote root exploit (SITE EXEC) fixed (fwd
        )
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2000 09:08:46 +1000

 - I, personally, have seen NO scanning for FTP services on
my networks.
   While this is admitedly anecdotal evidence, the last
exploit against
   WU-FTPD, which _did_ work and _was_ in widespread use,
was acompanied by
   a marked increase in such scans on the networks I
manage.  I have talked
   with several other network operators and most report no
increase in
   scanning; one did report he is seeing some FTP probes on
his campus.
   The probes and scans I am seeing are consistent with the
most-recent
   CERT Current Activity report (
   http://www.cert.org/current/current_activity.html ).

As a member of the System Administration group of a large
cable network
provider in the Netherlands I can state that there /has/ been
an increase
in FTP scans. Just as there was a noticeble increase in scans
on port 21
when wuftpd 2.5.0 was shown vulnerable.

I've seen only one scan on port 21 here, compared to numerous scans on other
ports, so it may be that those trying to make use of the exploit are
targetting specific areas/IP ranges.  By far the highest percentage (> 50%)
of scans are on the telnet port, followed by a mix of ports 109/tcp,
110/tcp, 111/tcp, 143/tcp, 1080/tcp, and a couple of UDP scans which
correcpond to Back Orifice and similar trojans.  Most scans are relatively
unsophisticated, looking more like manual connection attempts.  Probably 20%
are obviously automatic, trying one or more ports over the whole subnet.


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