IP: TMD (Theater Missile Defence)

[Dave Farber <farber () cis upenn edu>]

Date: Tue, 25 Feb 97 15:16:45 EST
To: fukuzawa () ucsd edu
From: "Richard J. Samuels" <samuels () MIT EDU>


DFS-ers:


I have read recent posts on Japanese TMD deployment with some interest.   In
addition to the issue of the size and consequence of the FSX "cloud" over
co-development (I think it will--and should-- be a huge influence on the way
any potential deal is structured) there is a larger strategic question of
whether or not deployment (or even development) will touch off a
destabilizing miltech race in the region.  There is also the unresoiolved
debate about how the US and Japan might manage to proceed without violating
arms control agreements.


Finally, though, there is the simple, pragmatic issue of whether or not such
a system works.  I passed along Mike Smitka's post to Ted Postol, the
resident expert at MIT on these matters.  He is called the "missile blower"
in these parts because he was the first to suggest (and demonstrate) that
DoD claims for the effectiveness of the Gulf War Patriot batteries were
wildly exaggerated.  Here is his response, and his offer to provide further
information.


I should add, by the way, that he has tried and failed to engage Chinese and
Japanese non-governmental engineers and scientists in a  dialogue about TMD.
The Japanese side has thus far refused to talk to the Chinese side.
Postol's reaction to Mike's post:


************
Postol begins:


This note is to provide some information relevant to a comment on the 
capabilities of the Patriot missile defense posted on Tue, 25 Feb 1997 by 
Michael Smitka. 


Our group at MIT has published a very detailed analysis of the performance of 
the Patriot PAC II during the 1991 Gulf War.  The analysis uses data from 
press video cameras during Patriot Scud engagements in Riyahd, Dahran, Tel 
Aviv and Haifa.  Extensive information was extracted from the video by 
combining the observed events with detailed numerical modelling of the basic 
motion of Scud missiles and Patriot interceptors in the atmosphere.  We also 
anlayzed the fuze-warhead system on the PAC II to understand the lethality of 
the Patriot against the high-crossing-speed Scud targets.  Our work has been 
reviewed by an independent panel of the American Physical Society and our 
analysis and analytical techniques have been found to be completely correct. 


Our work concludes that the Patriot PAC II almost certainly did not destroy 
even a single Scud warhead in the Gulf War of 1991.  We have identified 
several factors that largely explain why this occurred.


First, the Iraqi modified Al-Husayn Scud was unstable on atmospheric
reentry.  
As a result Scud targets would make erratic maneuvers that were too sudden
for 
the relatively unmaneuverable Patriot PAC II to match.  This caused the 
Patriots to have relatively large miss distances, resulting in the Patriot's 
missing their targets. 


Second, the fuze/warhead system in the Patriot was not designed to handle the 
high crossing speeds of roughly 3,500 m/s.  This is a fundamental design 
limitation of the PAC II Patriot interceptor.


The limitations of the PAC II fuze/warhead system were known, or should have 
been known, to the contractor, the Raytheon Company, and its customer, the US 
Army's Missile Command.  A congressional investigation of the Army's and 
Raytheon's claims about Patriot's Gulf War performance found numerous serious 
problems with the Army's and Raytheon's performance claims, which were 
initially a 96 percent success rate, far different from the probable zero 
percent success-rate shown by our analysis.  The General Accounting Office
and 
the Congressional Research Service issued independent investigation reports 
also confirming the findings of House Government Operations Committee 
investigators. 


Unfortunately, the past history of misrepresentations continues in the form
of 
ongoing unsupportable claims being made by the contractor, the US Army, and 
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, about the Patriot, Patriot 
upgrades, and other TMD systems currently under development.  I advise anyone 
interested in the problem of TMD to exercise great caution before accepting
or 
acting on claims about system capabilities made by these organizations. 


Our analysis of Patriot's Gulf War performance is available on request from: 


                 Professor Theodore A. Postol
                 MIT Center for International Studies
                 292 Main Street
                 Cambridge, MA 02142
                 Voice: (617) 253-8077
                 FAX: (617) 258-5750
                 E-Mail: postol () mit edu


I would also be more than pleased to discuss the findings in this report, and 
others we have done on TMD and NMD, with anyone who is interested. 


                            Ted Postol
                            Professor of Science, Technology, 
                              and National Security Policy
                            Defense and Arms Control Studies Program
                              and
                            Program in Science, Technology, and Society
                            Massachusetts Institute of Technology
************************
Richard J. Samuels
Ford International Professor and Head,
Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology           Tel.  (617)253-2449
Director, MIT Japan Program                     Fax.  (617)258-6164