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IP: Liberty Wins -- So Far


From: Dave Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 11:36:48 -0400


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From: Jose M Guardia <joseg () guardiasociados com>
Date: Mon, 16 Sep 2002 16:55:46 +0200
To: farber () cis upenn edu
Subject: Liberty Wins -- So Far

Hello,

Some days ago you posted my message about how odd it was that so many of my
fellow Europeans were so worried about the discussion of limitations of
liberty in the US, and were criticizing the US for an alleged lack of
democracy, while at the same time they were ignoring what's happening on
this side of the Atlantic. As I wrote then, things could certainly be
better in the US, and I understand you, Americans, can be worried about
what happens in your country. But I take issue with some of my fellow
Europeans, who think they can teach Democracy to a country whose society
and even political system is healthy enough to have an open discussion and
eventually tame the most extreme positions.

I just read this article in the Washington Post which is connected to this
topic, and I thought you might be interested.

Best regards and have a great year in Pittsburgh!

Jose

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A16362-2002Sep14.html

Liberty Wins -- So Far
Bush Runs Into Checks and Balances in Demanding New Powers
By Jeffrey Rosen
Sunday, September 15, 2002; Page B01

In the weeks and months after 9/ 11, we repeatedly heard that civil
liberties in America would face their greatest challenge in a generation.
Recalling the mass arrest of anarchists after World War I and the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, civil libertarians
predicted similar excesses. While nothing quite so dramatic has
materialized during the past year, many defenders of liberty on both the
right and the left have assailed the administration's actions and arguments.

Their fears raise a question: Will this period be regarded by future
historians as another dark age for the balance between liberty and
security? It's true that the Bush administration, like its predecessors in
wartime, has pressed for sweeping increases in executive authority, based
on the novel argument that the president has the unilateral power to
detain and investigate American citizens and alien residents without
oversight from Congress or the courts. But the more surprising development
is that the courts and Congress, unlike their predecessors in wartime, are
rejecting the president's most extreme claims.

In a series of court cases, federal judges have insisted on the importance
of judicial oversight of the president's powers of detention and
deportation. And in the debates over the USA Patriot Act and the homeland
security bill, libertarians on the right have joined with civil
libertarians on the left in persuading Congress to repudiate the Bush
administration's more draconian proposals for expanded surveillance
authority. In this sense, the greatest protector of American liberty
during the past year turned out to be something so basic that we often
take it for granted: the checks and balances provided by the separation of
powers in the Constitution.

In the course of researching the state of liberty and security after 9/11,
I've been especially struck by how restrained America's legal response
appears when contrasted with that of our European allies. Although they
weren't directly attacked, the countries of the European Union passed
anti-terrorism measures during the past year that are far more sweeping
than anything adopted in the United States. In October, France expanded
the powers of the police to search private property without a warrant.
Germany has engaged in religious profiling of suspected terrorists, a
practice that was upheld in a court challenge. In Britain, which has
become a kind of privacy dystopia, Parliament passed a sweeping
anti-terrorism law in December that authorizes a central government
authority to record and store all communications data generated by e-mail,
Internet browsing or other electronic communications, and to make the data
available to law enforcement without a court order. In May, the European
Union authorized all of its members to pass similar laws requiring data
retention.

The Bush administration has tried to emulate its European allies by
expanding executive authority in similarly dramatic ways. It asserted that
the president may designate citizens or aliens as enemy combatants and
detain them indefinitely without judicial review. It claimed that the
president may deport certain aliens based on secret hearings whose
existence is withheld from the pressand the public. And it attempted to
blur the legal lines that separate domestic law enforcement from foreign
intelligence gathering, transforming the FBI into the equivalent of
Britain's domestic security intelligence agency, MI5.

What distinguished America from Europe, however, is how quickly all three
of these extreme positions met with opposition from the other two branches
of government. In the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a 21-year- old American
citizen seized on the battlefield in Afghanistan and now locked in the
Navy brig in Norfolk, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit
refused to embrace what it called the "sweeping proposition" of the Bush
administration -- "namely that, with no meaningful judicial review, any
American citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant could be detained
indefinitely without charges or counsel on the government's say-so."
Hamdi, who is being held without charge as an enemy combatant, is
something of an accidental citizen -- his parents were Saudis who were
working here for a Saudi company when he was born. But other countries
have been even less solicitous of their citizens since 9/11. The new
British anti-terrorism law (now under appeal) gives the home secretary
unilateral power to designate as an "international terrorist" anyone whom
he perceives as a "risk to national security," and to indefinitely detain
the person without charge if the individual can't be deported.

American courts have also been aggressive in rebuffing the
administration's effort to keep secret the names and deportation hearings
of arrested aliens. In the months after 9/11, the government rounded up,
arrested and jailed more than 1,000 non-citizens in America as part of its
anti-terrorism investigation. Attorney General John Ashcroft refused to
release the names, claiming implausibly that he was protecting their
privacy. In August, Judge Gladys Kessler of the U.S. District Court in
Washington rejected Ashcroft's interpretation of the Freedom of
Information Act and the laws governing grand jury secrecy. She ordered
Ashcroft to release the names, insisting that any need for secrecy could
be established on a case-by-case basis.

Some of the judicial decisions rejecting the Bush administration's demands
for unilateral authority after 9/11 have been legally adventurous. A week
after the attacks, at Ashcroft's direction, the chief immigration judge
ordered all proceedings in deportation hearings to be closed to the press
and public, including family members and friends, in cases where the
government claimed a "special interest." But in August, the
Cincinnati-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit struck down the
order as a violation of the First Amendment. The government could close
individual cases, the appeals court held, but it couldn't unilaterally
impose secrecy across the board. This conclusion was arguably a stretch:
The Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment requires the
press and public to have access to civil as opposed to criminal trials.
But the appeals court's refusal to defer to the executive branch even in a
close case shows how confidently judges are asserting their authority
after 9/11.

Finally, the courts have resisted the administration's efforts to
dismantle the wall that separates domestic law enforcement from
intelligence gathering. In March, Ashcroft proposed new guidelines
allowing ordinary prosecutors to consult extensively with FBI agents who
are conducting foreign intelligence operations, resurrecting the specter
of domestic surveillance by the FBI that Congress specifically ruled out
in the 1970s. In an opinion made public last month, the seven members of
the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court unanimously rejected
the Bush administration's new guidelines, saying the rules subverted
Congress's intent. "To protect the privacy of Americans in these highly
intrusive surveillances and searches," the seven judges insisted on
restoring the "bright line" that prohibits criminal prosecutors from
directing and controlling the investigations of foreign spies and terrorists.

Congress, too, has resisted the Bush administration's most extreme demands
for increased surveillance authority. Since 9/11, an unusual congressional
alliance of civil libertarian liberals and libertarian conservatives has
forced the administration to remove some of the most draconian provisions
from the administration's proposed drafts of the USA Patriot Act and the
homeland security bill. At the insistence of House Majority Leader Dick
Armey (R-Tex.), for example, half of the new surveillance authorities in
the Patriot Act will expire after four years, and the administration must
report to Congress about its deployment of the Carnivore e-mail
surveillance program. The House's version of the homeland security bill
explicitly opposes proposals for a national identification card and for
Ashcroft's TIPS program, which would encourage citizens to spy on each
other. The USA Patriot Act, in its final form, includes new powers for
e-mail surveillance and secret searches that the Clinton administration
had sought -- unsuccessfully -- after the Oklahoma City bombing. But it
would have been more extreme without the principled oversight of
Republicans and Democrats suspicious of government power.

There were anti-government libertarians, of course, in the 19th and early
20th centuries, but there was no judicial tradition of vigorous protection
for free speech until after World War II. This is why President Woodrow
Wilson's attorney general, A. Mitchell Palmer, had a free hand to arrest
thousands of alleged communists in 1919 and 1920 and hold them without
trial before deporting many of them. Until Vietnam, Congress was similarly
deferential to the president during wartime: Even FDR's isolationist
critics abandoned their opposition after Pearl Harbor, and none questioned
the internment of Japanese Americans.

What explains the refusal of courts and Congress during the latest crisis
to grant the Bush administration's most extreme demands for unilateral
authority? Part of the explanation may reflect what Chief Justice William
Rehnquist has written about the history of civil liberties during wartime.
According to Rehnquist, the increasing judicial and congressional concern
about civil liberties during the major wars of the 20th century has led to
progressively fewer attempts at executive branch overreaching. So the
reaction of the courts and Congress, one could argue, is in keeping with
the established trend. Also, as Cass Sunstein and Jack Goldsmith of the
University of Chicago have suggested, Americans in general -- as well as
judges and legislators in particular -- may be less deferential to
authority, and more committed to civil liberties, than they were before
the legal and social transformations that followed the 1960s.

In the case of the courts, we may be seeing the bright side of the
attitude of judicial supremacy that has become ever more pronounced since
the 1960s. On both the left and the right, judges over the past four
decades have become increasingly reluctant to defer to the political
branches. When confronted with unilateral claims of executive authority,
judges have seemed almost indignant at the administration's refusal to
respect what they see as their unique prerogative to say what the law is.
Judges who have no doubt about their own ability to resolve political
questions -- from abortion to a presidential election -- are not likely to
be cowed by the executive's demands for deference during a time of crisis;
instead, the courts expect Congress and the president to defer to them. By
refusing to make even a feint of respect toward judges who have become
accustomed to casting themselves as national saviors, the Bush
administration may be provoking a backlash even among more conservative
judges who are instinctively inclined to show the flag.

Among libertarians in Congress, the dynamic is different. There have
always been minority groups in America who are suspicious of central
government, from the anti-Masons in the 19th century to the John Birch
conservatives of the 1950s. What is distinctive about our most recent
debate is the alliance of libertarian conservatives whose dislike for
federal surveillance was honed during the Clinton era with civil
libertarian liberals who remember President Richard Nixon's surveillance
of Vietnam protesters.

In suggesting that the legal response to 9/11 might have been far more
extreme if Congress and the courts had not opposed the Bush
administration's unilateral demands, I don't mean to underestimate the
challenges ahead. As William Stuntz of Harvard Law School has argued,
legislative and judicial responses to visible crime waves tend to be felt
a few years after the threat occurs. Certainly, if there is another
terrorist attack, libertarians in Congress and the courts may not be able
to resist the executive branch's and the public's unrealistic demand for
security above all. And the administration is now considering a series of
ill-designed security technologies -- from trusted-traveler programs to
data mining and profiling at airports -- that might threaten privacy
without increasing security, and might linger long after the immediate
threat has passed.

Nevertheless, a year after 9/11, it's worth engaging in a cautious
celebration of the resilience of our constitutional checks and balances.
So far, in the face of great stress, the system has worked relatively
well. The executive branch tried to increase its own authority across the
board, but the courts and Congress are insisting on a more reasoned
balance between liberty and security. Of all of the lessons about
America's strength that have emerged since the attacks, this is one of the
most reassuring.

Jeffrey Rosen is an associate professor at George Washington University
Law School and the legal affairs editor of the New Republic. His book on
liberty and security after 9/11 will be published by Random House next year.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company



***************************************************
Jose M Guardia
Internet, Media & Technology Analyst
Barcelona, Spain
Ph. [++34] 629-74-26-24
E-mail: joseg () guardiasociados com
AOL: jmguardia  |   ICQ: 13293962  |   YAHOO: joseguardia
www.guardiasociados.com
***************************************************



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