Shamos: Why e-voting paper trails are a bad idea

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

> From: Ed Gerck <egerck () nma com>
> Date: April 22, 2008 10:42:18 AM PDT
> To: David Farber <dave () farber net>, Ip Ip <ip () v2 listbox com>
> Subject: Re: [IP] Shamos: Why e-voting paper trails are a bad idea

> [Dave: for IP, if you wish]
>
> Shamos is right to point out that the emphasis on a paper trail is
> unjustified, even so because the need for independent auditing cannot
> favor just one recording media [paper] as if it were the silver  
> bullet.
>
> On  Aug 28, 2001, I discussed the independent auditing of DREs
> without /necessarily/ adding paper media, in my talk "Voting with
> Witness Voting: Qualified Reliance on
> Electronic Voting", in the WOTE '01 seminar organized by
> Caltech/MIT, and presented practical examples. A copy is
> available at:
> http://www.vote.caltech.edu/wote01/pdfs/gerck-witness.pdf
>
> The solution does not rely only on paper, as a 'favored'
> media, but on allowing multiple channels of observation,
> as independent as possible, called "witnesses". It is proven,
> under general Information Theory considerations, that full
> channel independence is not required for the system to work.
>
> The Witness-Voting System (WVS), without requiring paper and paper
> costs, is able to prove to anyone that every vote counts. Paper
> and other media can also be used. The WVS verifies whether what
> the voter sees and confirms on the screen is what is actually
> recorded and counted. The WVS provides any desired number of
> independent records, which are readily available to be reviewed
> by election officials, without ever linking voters to ballots. Even if
> there would be a court order mandating everyone to reveal all secrets,
> voter privacy would still prevail.
>
> The WVS can be securely networked in a precinct, tethering a
> number of voter stations to a WVS server cluster -- simplifying
> certification while reducing down time, setup costs and setup time.
>
> In particular, now that governmental and private secure record keeping
> is clearly finding that paper is the least favored recording medium
> specially
> in regard to cost, storage, availability (in the technical IT sense),
> security and survivability, it seems anachronic to have anyone
> suggesting paper records as the "silver bullet" against election fraud
> in DREs.
>
> In conclusion, my comments are:
>
> 1. We should favor a technologically-neutral solution for independent
> auditing of DREs, rather than postulate one particular media (paper)
> over others. There are better media than paper.
>
> 2. My WOTE 2001 talk op. cit. is the first public presentation of a
> practical, independent auditing solution to assure everyone that all
> votes are indeed counted, without any compromise of voter privacy.
>
>
> Best regards,
> Ed Gerck

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