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[nanog () Overkill EnterZone Net: Extensions to RFC1998 - WAS: Re: DoS Attacks]
From: Haesu <haesu () towardex com>
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2003 00:01:56 -0400
Forwarding to NANOG on behalf of Mr. Fraizer. Please don't shoot the messenger for any arguable/discussions. -hc -- Haesu C. TowardEX Technologies, Inc. Consulting, colocation, web hosting, network design and implementation http://www.towardex.com | haesu () towardex com Cell: (978)394-2867 | Office: (978)263-3399 Ext. 170 Fax: (978)263-0033 | POC: HAESU-ARIN ----- Forwarded message from John Fraizer <nanog () Overkill EnterZone Net> ----- X-Original-To: haesu () mx01 bos ma towardex com Delivered-To: haesu () mx01 bos ma towardex com Date: Wed, 8 Oct 2003 21:58:26 -0400 (EDT) From: John Fraizer <nanog () Overkill EnterZone Net> To: Haesu <haesu () towardex com> Cc: nanog () merit edu, a_spicer () bellsouth net Subject: Extensions to RFC1998 - WAS: Re: DoS Attacks In-Reply-To: <20031009004646.GB88086 () scylla towardex com> X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=EMAIL_ATTRIBUTION,IN_REP_TO,QUOTED_EMAIL_TEXT, REPLY_WITH_QUOTES,USER_AGENT_PINE version=2.55 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.55 (1.174.2.19-2003-05-19-exp) On Wed, 8 Oct 2003, Haesu wrote:
Hmmmm? What did I miss? When did RFC1998 get updated to include Null community? Feel free to let me know if they updated RFC on that lately.. b/c I havent checked it in a while. As far as I know, my upstreams are fully RFC1998 compliant and I use them well. -hc
Note: please echo this to the list. I don't have post
access. Ahem... Sue...Ahem...
The RFC itself hasn't been updated to include a Null community but if you
think about it, providing a NULL community is fully within the concept of
allowing customers to influence routing policy with the use of community
strings.
For example:
!
router bgp 65534
neighbor a.a.a.a remote-as 65530
neighbor a.a.a.a description Customer AS65530
neighbor a.a.a.a prefix-list AS-65530 in
neighbor a.a.a.a route-map CUSTOMERS in
!
ip prefix-list AS-65530 seq 5 permit x.x.x.x/y le 32
!
ip community-list standard POISON permit 65534:666
!
route-map CUSTOMERS permit 10
match community POISON
set local-preference 500
set ip next-hop [ip address of your sink-hole]
!
Of course, the rest of the route-map CUSTOMERS is going to need to do some
sanity checks on the announcements you accept from the customers OTHER
than blackhole requests. In our case, we pass them through a prefix-list
match that includes:
ip prefix-list CUSTOMERS seq 10 deny 0.0.0.0/0 ge 25
As you can see, we're doing a prefix-list check against the announcements
that the customer sends us in the neighbor statement. Each customer gets
their own prefix-list that covers the networks that we have LOA to accept
from that customer. (Keeps boneheads from blackholing OTHER people!)
The first stanza in the CUSTOMERS route-map checks for the POISON
community. Any prefix that the customer sends us that includes this
community will be routed to our sink-hole.
The rest of the stanzas in the CUSTOMERS route-map look for other
communities from the customer. One stanza looks to see if the customer is
requesting us to pass their announcements of our address space on as
de-aggregated announcements. If we don't see that community, they're
aggregated. Other stanzas in the route-map are pretty cut and dry
RFC1998.
Our customers can do the following:
Community Action
---------------------------------------------
13944:0 Don't announce to any peer
13944:1 Don't announce to PEERS
13944:2 Don't announce to TRANSIT
13944:3 Don't announce to CUSTOMERS
13944:20 Announce specific from EnterZone aggregate
for customers who are running on our IPs.
13944:90 Set preference to 90
13944:100 Set preference to 100
13944:110 Set preference to 110
13944:120 Set preference to 120
13944:666 Poison a Route
13944:NNN0 don't announce to Peer NNN
13944:NNN1 prepend once towards Peer NNN
13944:NNN2 prepend twice towards Peer NNN
13944:NNN3 prepend thrice towards Peer NNN
Any time I do any consulting on another network, I recommend that they at
MINIMUM implement the Poisoned Route ability. It is not terribly
difficult to do as you can see above.
--
John Fraizer
EnterZone, Inc
(13944+$|13944+_14813+$|13944+_17266+$)
PGP Key = 6C5903C4
Fingerprint = 2AA6 6614 1B5E EDD2 38AD C417 3E61 F975 6C59 03C4
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- [nanog () Overkill EnterZone Net: Extensions to RFC1998 - WAS: Re: DoS Attacks] Haesu (Oct 08)
