nanog mailing list archives

Re: IPv6 news


From: Mark Smith <random () 72616e646f6d20323030342d30342d31360a nosense org>
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2005 07:15:13 +0930


On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 07:57:52 -0700
David Meyer <dmm () 1-4-5 net> wrote:

On Sun, Oct 16, 2005 at 01:45:40AM -0700, Tony Li wrote:


<snip>

This is probably the most common misunderstanding of the end-to-end  
principle out there.  Someone else can dig up the quote, but  
basically, the principle says that the network should not replicate  
functionality that the hosts already have to perform.  You have to  
look at X.25's hop-by-hop data windows to truly grok this point.

Many people pick this up and twist it into ~the network has to be  
application agnostic~ and then use this against NATs or firewalls,  
which is simply a misuse of the principle.  Really, this is a  
separate principle in and of its own right.  It's not one that I  
subscribe to, but that's a different conversation...

      Maybe its time to pull out some of Noel's work on both
      topics. Reasonable introductions to both the e2e
      principle and locator/id split topics can be found on 

        http://users.exis.net/~jnc/tech/end_end.html and
        http://users.exis.net/~jnc/tech/endpoints.txt


Tony is right, thinking about it a bit more, I've mixed the two
together. I first came across the end-to-end argument (the "X.25"
example) in "Routing In the Internet". The other stuff (as well as e2e)
was in RFC1958, "Architectural Principles of the Internet", and a few
other places.

I see value in getting rid of NAT and firewalls (protecting host based
functions) out of the network because I've been burned by NAT on a few
occasions (due to its stateful nature, due to its lack of application
protocol support, due to its complexity when public address space would
have been a simpler and cheaper solution), and with hosts starting to
have multiple interfaces i.e. wired and wireless, it makes sense to me
that firewalling on the host itself is a better way to protect them,
rather than relying on a network topology located firewall that only
protects against attacks coming upstream from the firewall. We've
already pretty much evolved to the host based firewalling model anyway,
with all major desktop/server OSes coming out of the box already with
one. I think the major component missing is scalable policy deployment,
although I've been told that they are being developed as well.

I'm practical about NATs and network-located firewalls though, and
although I don't necessarily like doing it much, will suggest the
"conventional" NAT/firewall models/solutions when necessary.


Regards,
Mark.

-- 

        The Internet's nature is peer to peer.


Current thread: