Re: Connectivity status for Egypt

["Patrick W. Gilmore" <patrick () ianai net>]

On Jan 28, 2011, at 11:24 AM, Jared Mauch wrote:

> I have seen nation state disconnects where light is lost. 

The question is not whether that would it (it obviously would).  The question is whether it is important if the laser 
stops blinking or just blinks in ways that end users can't see all the YouTube, web pages, twitter posts, etc. that the 
gov't doesn't want them to see.

I think it does not matter.  Censorship is censorship.  (So much for "routing around it".)

-- 
TTFN,
patrick


> On Jan 28, 2011, at 11:17 AM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jan 28, 2011 at 2:44 AM, Jake Khuon <khuon () neebu net> wrote:
> >
> > > I guess this begs the question of whether or not we're seeing actual
> > > layer1 going down or just the effects of mass BGP withdrawals.  Are we
> > > seeing lights out on fibre links or just peering sessions going down?
> > > Both could still point to a coordinated intentional blackout by the
> > > Egyptian gov't though.
> >
> > out of curiousity, what's the difference though between loss of light
> > and peer shutdown? If the local gov't comes in and says: "Make the
> > internets go down", you as the op choose how to do that... NOT getting
> > calls from your peer for interface alarms is probably sane. You can
> > simply drop your routes, leave BGP running even and roll ...
> >
> > If it's clear (and it seems to be) that the issue is a
> > nation-state-decision... implementation (how it's done, no IF it's
> > done) isn't really important, is it?
> >
> > -chris