nanog mailing list archives
Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US
From: Brett Frankenberger <rbf+nanog () panix com>
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2011 07:59:56 -0600
On Mon, Nov 21, 2011 at 11:16:14PM -0500, Jay Ashworth wrote:
Precisely. THe case in point example these days is traffic light controllers. I know from traffic light controllers; when I was a kid, that was my dad's beat for the City of Boston. Being a geeky kid, I drilled the guys in the signal shop, the few times I got to go there (Saturdays, and such). The old design for traffic signal controllers was that the relays that drove each signal/group were electrically interlocked: the relay that made N/S able to engage it's greens *got its power from* the relay that made E/W red; if there wasn't a red there, you *couldn't* make the other direction green. These days, I'm not sure that's still true: I can *see* the signal change propagate across a row of 5 LED signals from one end to the other. Since I don't think the speed of electricity is slow enough to do that (it's probably on the order of 5ms light to light), I have to assume that it's processor delay as the processor runs a display list to turn on output transistors that drive the LED light heads. That implies to me that it is *physically* possible to get opposing greens (which we refer to, in technical terms as "traffic fatalities") out of the controller box... in exactly the same way that it didn't used to be. That's unsettling enough that I'm going to go hunt down a signal mechanic and ask.
The typical implementation in a modern controller is to have a separate
conflict monitor unit that will detect when conflicting greens (for
example) are displayed, and trigger a (also separate) flasher unit that
will cause the signal to display a flashing red in all directions
(sometimes flashing yellow for one higher volume route).
So the controller would output conflicting greens if it failed or was
misprogrammed, but the conflict monitor would detect that and restore
the signal to a safe (albeit flashing, rather than normal operation)
state.
-- Brett
Current thread:
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US, (continued)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Jay Ashworth (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Mark Radabaugh (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Charles Mills (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Mark Radabaugh (Nov 21)
- RE: First real-world SCADA attack in US Jason Gurtz (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Christopher Morrow (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Jimmy Hess (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Jay Ashworth (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Jussi Peltola (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Valdis . Kletnieks (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Brett Frankenberger (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Jay Ashworth (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Brett Frankenberger (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Charles Mills (Nov 21)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Matthew Kaufman (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US andrew.wallace (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Michael Painter (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Joe Hamelin (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Mike Andrews (Nov 23)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Valdis . Kletnieks (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Steven Bellovin (Nov 22)
- Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US Steven Bellovin (Nov 22)
