nanog mailing list archives

Re: LinkedIn password database compromised


From: Mark Andrews <marka () isc org>
Date: Fri, 08 Jun 2012 09:00:45 +1000


In message <4FD0AE52.20602 () alter3d ca>, Peter Kristolaitis writes:
On 6/7/2012 9:22 AM, James Snow wrote:
On Wed, Jun 06, 2012 at 11:14:58PM -0700, Aaron C. de Bruyn wrote:
Imaging signing up for a site by putting in your email and pasting
your public key.
Yes! Yes! Yes!

I've been making this exact argument for about a year. It even retains
the same "email a link" reset mechanism when someone needs to reset
their key.

A common counter-argument is, "But ordinary Internet users won't
understand SSH keys." They don't need to! The idea is easily explained
via a lock-and-key metaphor that people already understand. The UI for
walking users through key creation is easily imagined.


-Snow

Oh yeah, I can just imagine that "lock and key" conversation now...

"Imagine if the website has a lock on it, and you tell them what key you =

want to use by giving them a copy."
"But if they have a copy of my key, couldn't they use it to open all of=20
the other locks I've set up to use it?"
"(explain public key crypto)"
"(drool, distraction by the latest Facebook feature)"

No.  The correct metaphor is I have a key and a bunch of locks keyed to that
lock.  I give them a lock to install which only the key I have can open.
 
The other problem with this approach is that, as bad as trusting remote=20
sites to do security properly is, I'm not sure that putting a "one key=20
to rule them all" on users' machines is that much better, given the=20
average user's penchant for installing malware on their machine because=20
"FunnyMonkeyScreensaver.exe" sounded like such a good idea at the=20
time...   I suspect we'd see a huge wave of malware whose sole purpose=20
is to steal public keys (and you KNOW users won't password-protect their =
private keys!).

Actually it is a big win.  You now have to compromise millions of machines
to get millions of keys rather than a couple of machines to get millions
of passwords.

  Plus, now you have the problem of users not being able =
to login to their favourite websites when they're using a friend's=20
computer, internet cafe, etc, unless they've remembered to bring a copy=20
of their private key with them.

That is a real issue.
 
I think public key auth for websites is a great idea for geeks who=20
understand the benefits, limitations and security concerns, but I have=20
serious doubts that it would hold up when subjected to the "idiot test".

- Pete
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: marka () isc org


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