nanog mailing list archives
RE: Thank you, Comcast.
From: "Keith Medcalf" <kmedcalf () dessus com>
Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2016 08:55:20 -0700
On Friday, 26 February, 2016 08:13, Jason_Livingood () comcast com said:
FWIW, Comcast's list of blocked ports is at http://customer.xfinity.com/help-and-support/internet/list-of-blocked- ports/. The suspensions this week are in direct response to reported abuse from amplification attacks, which we obviously take very seriously.
God is that a horrid web page. I cannot view it. The wheels on the bus go round and round non-stop. It has so much intertwined malicious javascript, cross-site scripting, and malicious trackers that the alarm klaxons go off when I attempt to access it. I spent a couple of minutes attempting to access the page but still maintaining blocks to the malicious links. Apparently, viewing the page requires that all security be turned off and that the viewer allows completely untrusted code from completely untrustworty sources to run unabated on the viewers computer. I do not permit this. For anyone. Ever. This pretty much ensures that I would never be one of your customers. If you cannot operate a server which serves renderable non-malicious web pages properly, what hope is there that you can do anything else right?
We are in the process of considering adding some new ports to this block list right now, and one big suggestion is SSDP. If you have any others you wish to suggest please send them to me and the guy on the cc line (Nirmal Mody).
On 2/26/16, 9:31 AM, "NANOG on behalf of Keith Medcalf" <nanog-
bounces () nanog org on behalf of kmedcalf () dessus com> wrote:
ISP's should block nothing, to or from the customer, unless they
make it clear *before* selling the service (and include it in the Terms
and Conditions of Service Contract), that they are not selling an Internet
connection but are selling a partially functional Internet connection (or
a limited Internet Service), and specifying exactly what the built-in
deficiencies are.
Deficiencies may include:
port/protocol blockage toward the customer (destination blocks)
port/protocol blockage toward the internet (source blocks)
DNS diddling (filtering of responses, NXDOMAIN
redirection/wildcards, etc)
Traffic Shaping/Policing/Congestion policies, inbound and outbound
Some ISPs are good at this and provide opt-in/out methods for at
least the first three on the list. Others not so much.
-----Original Message-----
From: NANOG [mailto:nanog-bounces () nanog org] On Behalf Of
Maxwell Cole
Sent: Friday, 26 February, 2016 07:19
To: Mikael Abrahamsson
Cc: NANOG list
Subject: Re: Thank you, Comcast.
I agree,
At the very least things like SNMP/NTP should be blocked. I
mean how many
people actually run a legit NTP server out of their home?
Dozens? And the
people who run SNMP devices with the default/common
communities aren't the
ones using it.
If the argument is that you need a Business class account to
run a mail
server then I have no problem extending that to DNS servers
also.
Cheers,
Max
> On Feb 26, 2016, at 8:55 AM, Mikael Abrahamsson
<swmike () swm pp se>
wrote:
>
> On Fri, 26 Feb 2016, Nick Hilliard wrote:
>
>> Traffic from dns-spoofing attacks generally has src port =
53 and dst
port = random. If you block packets with udp src port=53
towards
customers, you will also block legitimate return traffic if
the customers
run their own DNS servers or use opendns / google dns / etc.
>
> Sure, it's a very interesting discussion what ports should
be blocked or
not.
>
> http://www.bitag.org/documents/Port-Blocking.pdf
>
> This mentions on page 3.1, TCP(UDP)/25,135,139 and 445.
They've been
blocked for a very long time to fix some issues, even though
there is
legitimate use for these ports.
>
> So if you're blocking these ports, it seems like a small
step to block
UDP/TCP/53 towards customers as well. I can't come up with an
argument
that makes sense to block TCP/25 and then not block port
UDP/TCP/53 as
well. If you're protecting the Internet from your customers
misconfiguraiton by blocking port 25 and the MS ports, why not
53 as well?
>
> This is a slippery slope of course, and judgement calls are
not easy to
make.
>
> --
> Mikael Abrahamsson email: swmike () swm pp se
Current thread:
- Re: Thank you, Comcast., (continued)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Jared Mauch (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Damian Menscher via NANOG (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Roland Dobbins (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Dovid Bender (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Jared Mauch (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Damian Menscher via NANOG (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Dovid Bender (Feb 26)
- Re[2]: Thank you, Comcast. Adam (Feb 26)
- RE: Thank you, Comcast. Keith Medcalf (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Livingood, Jason (Feb 26)
- RE: Thank you, Comcast. Keith Medcalf (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Mike Hammett (Feb 26)
- RE: Thank you, Comcast. Naslund, Steve (Feb 26)
- RE: Thank you, Comcast. Keith Medcalf (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Mike Hammett (Feb 26)
- RE: Thank you, Comcast. Keith Medcalf (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Rich Kulawiec (Feb 27)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Mike Hammett (Feb 27)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Rich Kulawiec (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Henry Yen (Feb 26)
- Re: Thank you, Comcast. Blake Hudson (Feb 26)
