nanog mailing list archives
Re: Spitballing IoT Security
From: bzs () TheWorld com
Date: Sat, 29 Oct 2016 14:31:05 -0400
On October 29, 2016 at 14:07 esr () thyrsus com (Eric S. Raymond) wrote:
bzs () TheWorld com <bzs () TheWorld com>:On October 28, 2016 at 22:27 list () satchell net (Stephen Satchell) wrote: > On 10/28/2016 10:14 PM, bzs () TheWorld com wrote: > > Thus far the goal just seems to be mayhem. > > Thus far, the goal on the part of the botnet opearators is to make > money. The goal of the CUSTOMERS of the botnet operators? Who knows? You're speaking in general terms, right? We don't know much anything about the perpetrators of these recent Krebs and Dyn attacks such as whether there was any DDoS for hire involved.We can deduce a lot from what didn't happen. You don't build or hire a botnet on Mirai's scale with pocket change.
Do we know this or is this just a guess? The infamous 1988 Morris worm was also thought to be something similarly sinister for a short while until Bob Morris, Jr et al owned up to it just being an experiment by a couple of students gone out of control. Back around 1986 I accidentally brought down at least half the net by submitting a new hosts file (for Boston Univ) with an entry that tickled a bug in the hosts.txt->/etc/hosts code which everyone ran at midnight (whatever) causing a loop which filled /tmp (this would be unix hosts but by count they were by far most of the connected servers) and back then a full /tmp crashed unix and it often didn't come back up until a human intervened. Ok I doubt this was an accident, tho its scale could've been an accident, a prank gone wild. Anyhow what do we *know*? That the effect was large doesn't necessarily imply that it required a lot of resources. We live in a world rife with asymmetric warfare. A few boxcutters and 3,000+ people dead.
And the M.O. doesn't fit a criminal organization - no ransom demand, no attempt to steal data.
Same question. Would Dyn et al publicize ransom demands at this point? And even if not how do we rule out a prank or similar? Is there something specific about this attack which required significant resources? How significant?
That means the motive was prep for terrorism or cyberwar by a state-level actor. Bruce Schneier is right and is only saying what everybody else on the InfoSec side I've spoken with is thinking - the People's Liberation Army is the top suspect, with the Russian FSB operating through proxies in Bulgaria or Romania as a fairly distant second.
Well, barring further details one can go anywhere with a few suppositions.
Me, I think this fits the profile of a PLA probing attack perfectly.
--
<a href="http://www.catb.org/~esr/">Eric S. Raymond</a>
--
-Barry Shein
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Current thread:
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security, (continued)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Mike Meredith (Oct 27)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Mel Beckman (Oct 27)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Eliot Lear (Oct 28)
- RE: Spitballing IoT Security Keith Medcalf (Oct 27)
- RE: Spitballing IoT Security bzs (Oct 27)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Jim Hickstein (Oct 28)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security bzs (Oct 28)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Stephen Satchell (Oct 28)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security bzs (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Eric S. Raymond (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security bzs (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Jean-Francois Mezei (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Tom Beecher (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security bzs (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Ronald F. Guilmette (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Eric S. Raymond (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Ronald F. Guilmette (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Eric S. Raymond (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security bzs (Oct 30)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security John Weekes (Oct 29)
- Re: Spitballing IoT Security Pierre Lamy (Oct 31)
