nanog mailing list archives

Re: BGP prefix filter list / BGP hijacks, different type


From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com>
Date: Fri, 17 May 2019 10:27:37 -0400

Did this get resolved? if not please email me directly.

On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 9:46 AM Denys Fedoryshchenko
<nuclearcat () nuclearcat com> wrote:

I wanted to mention one additional important point in all these
monitoring discussion.
Right now, for one of my subnets Google services stopped working.
Why? Because it seems like someone from Russia did BGP hijack, BUT,
exclusively for google services (most likely some kind of peering).
Quite by chance, I noticed that the traceroute from the google cloud to
this subnet goes through Russia, although my country has nothing to do
with Russia at all, not even transit traffic through them.
Sure i mailed noc@google, but reaching someone in big companies is not
easiest job, you need to search for some contact that answers. And good
luck for realtime communications.
And, all large CDNs have their own "internet", although they have BGP,
they often interpret it in their own way, which no one but them can
monitor and keep history. No looking glass for sure, as well.
If your network is announced by a malicious party from another country,
you will not even know about it, but your requests(actually answers from
service) will go through this party.


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