
nanog mailing list archives
Re: MD5 is slow
From: Tom Beecher via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2025 12:24:51 -0400
I would prefer the same explanation, but in relation to ISIS or OSPF.
I addressed this previously. IS-IS and OSPF both have delays so that SPF isn't constantly running if a given network is unstable. Take for example an IS-IS network on a Juniper. By default : - For a point to point interface, R1 transmits CSNPs every 5000ms. - R2 receives CSNP, and updates its LSDB. - LSDB change = topology change. R2 starts a 200ms timer before running SPF. - If additional CSNPs are received such that R2 runs SPF 3 times in succession. ( 600ms ) , R2 starts a holddown timer, preventing any additional SPF runs for the next 5000ms. If you changed values to their platform minimums : - csnp tx interval : 1000ms - spf delay : 50ms So your BEST case is still 1050ms + 1/2 link RTT. ( These would probably be really bad to use in a real network too. ) Does this make it clear why even a couple theoretical extra ms of processing time is not a concern? On Thu, Sep 11, 2025 at 2:05 AM Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG < nanog () lists nanog org> wrote:
Because the BGP is not relevant (event propagation time is not important, not to the ms level), I would prefer the same explanation, but in relation to ISIS or OSPF. Yes, it is called MAC. Example configuration is explained, for example, here: https://netquirks.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/is-is-md5-authentication.pdf Eduard -----Original Message----- From: nanog--- via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org> Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2025 20:07 To: North American Network Operators Group <nanog () lists nanog org> Cc: nanog () immibis com Subject: RE: MD5 is slow The MD5 option of BGP (or TCP more generally, but only BGP really uses it) combines each TCP packet with a password that's configured the same on both sides of the connection, then hashes the combination, and transmits it in the packet. The receiver does the same calculation, and if the receiver's calculated hash doesn't match the one in the packet, it ignores the packet. This procedure is more specifically called a "message authentication code" or MAC and the password is actually a "key" for the MAC. On 10 September 2025 15:53:17 CEST, Nicholas Warren via NANOG < nanog () lists nanog org> wrote:Can someone with experience in list discussions tell me what's happeningright now? Why are passwords and secrets being associated with hashing?Operationally, I'm getting from this that spoofing IGP packets is apopular pastime.Nich -----Original Message----- From: Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org> Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2025 8:25 AM To: Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc>; North American Network Operators Group <nanog () lists nanog org> Cc: Vasilenko Eduard <vasilenko.eduard () huawei com> Subject: RE: MD5 is slow BGP would never be fast, because it could be a DDoS attack vector byitself (push expensive BGP to run very often on the alien domain).Many people did tuning of the IGP to achieve “sub-second”. Some number of ms * a few hops * 2 => it is something like 1/5 of the“sub-second”.If it is not important, why do people do something like this RFC 9681 - IS-IS Fast Flooding<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9681> Symmetric encryption may be used only for authentication. But it isbetter to encrypt the whole header if symmetric encryption is available.Eduard From: Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc> Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2025 15:28 To: North American Network Operators Group <nanog () lists nanog org> Cc: Saku Ytti <saku () ytti fi>; Vasilenko Eduard <vasilenko.eduard () huawei com> Subject: Re: MD5 is slow It is the reason why symmetric encryption is much stronger for this usecase. Hence, symmetric encryption does not need to be slow.Symmetric encryption is faster when the data size in question is large. The delta between symmetric and asymmetric is negligible at the data sizes in scope for networking protocols. (Also hashes in protocols aren't being used for ENCRYPTION, they're being used for AUTHENTICATION. ) Also, even if we assert the 5ms per hash calculation is accurate (although to be clear I agree it is not ), it is STILL basically a no-op. ISIS and OSPF implementations have spf-delay timers ( different by vendor ) to prevent constant calculation churn during instability. BGP UPDATES received have to process through Adj-Rib-In , then go into Loc-Rib, then go into main RIB with all other protocol routes, then you have to bestpath THAT to get the FIB , which then gets turned around and transmitted as appropriate.Hash calculations , even if hypothetically repeated at each step ( whichthey are not ) , are a negligible part of the convergence delay, at any scale.On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 7:13 AM Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org<mailto:nanog () lists nanog org>> wrote:Hi Ytti, It looks like you are trying to teach me what is "salt". Salt + passwordgreatly increases the challenge for the attacker: it is not possible to map a hash to a password just from the database (in 1 step).For the attacker in the networking protocol case, the "salt" is alwaysvisible (these are additional fields from packet headers).The attacker could still try different passwords from the database. Butit would need many steps; every step is effectively the same processing as on the legitimate host (headers + password).If we assume that on some platform (GPU?), the performance would be veryfast (10B/sec), then all typical passwords would be tried in seconds.It is not acceptable. Hash must be slow! (if used for signature, because hash for load balancing or routing tables have no such problem - they need only good randomness) For symmetric encryption, the "salt" is the internal state of theencryption engine (initialization vector?) - it is not visible and changed/preserved between packets.It is the reason why symmetric encryption is much stronger for this usecase. Hence, symmetric encryption does not need to be slow.Ed/ -----Original Message----- From: Saku Ytti <saku () ytti fi<mailto:saku () ytti fi>> Sent: Wednesday, September 10, 2025 13:11 To: North American Network Operators Group <nanog () lists nanog org<mailto:nanog () lists nanog org>> Cc: Vasilenko Eduard <vasilenko.eduard () huawei com<mailto:vasilenko.eduard () huawei com>> Subject: Re: MD5 is slow On Wed, 10 Sept 2025 at 13:01, Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org<mailto:nanog () lists nanog org>> wrote:IMHO: Then it was bad design. The source text is visible if a hash isused for the signature. Only the password is not known.Please make a serious attempt in trying to understand how applicationsare different.Try to understand why unix passwords benefit from slow hash. You onlyhave the password hash as output, any input that provides same hash, is equivalent. So any collision you find, you have exactly the same problem and serious problem.MD5 or SHA in BGP, ISIS, OSPF are not like this. There isn't evennecessarily guarantee that useful collisions exist, as you may not have enough bits that can have arbitrary value while keeping PDU valid and conducive towards your attack vector.Most collisions would be garbage, where PDU is rejected. Therefore evenif we assume we could cause MD5, SHA collisions, it wouldn't still matter.You have good rationale in wanting slow hash, but you struggle tounderstand why not all applications are about hashing 8byte secrets.-- ++ytti _______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/nanog () lists nanog org/message/5E2 2LVBXJI4WQUE6CQUOCJ7GJB4XQ5ZL/ _______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/nanog () lists nanog org/message/Q7R J7HFDGPW3D45PJGWSX5GJ5H3BLSV3/ _______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/nanog () lists nanog org/message/ZVG RMCGRF4OZN2UKUAYITCSMG6SXYPTL/_______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/nanog () lists nanog org/message/UYFO4NJY2TSASMTHHSE3HUK7PNHDJHPD/ _______________________________________________ NANOG mailing list https://lists.nanog.org/archives/list/nanog () lists nanog org/message/EGMXOLSPSIYB7F3O576C4Q3DBIR27MDS/
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Current thread:
- RE: MD5 is slow, (continued)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 11)
- Re: MD5 is slow nanog--- via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 10)
- Re: MD5 is slow Saku Ytti via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 10)
- Re: MD5 is slow Tom Beecher via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow Nicholas Warren via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow nanog--- via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 10)
- Re: MD5 is slow Tom Beecher via NANOG (Sep 11)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 12)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 10)
- Re: MD5 is slow Jay Acuna via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 10)
- Re: MD5 is slow Matthew Petach via NANOG (Sep 09)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 09)
- Re: MD5 is slow Matthew Petach via NANOG (Sep 10)
- RE: MD5 is slow Vasilenko Eduard via NANOG (Sep 11)
- Re: MD5 is slow Saku Ytti via NANOG (Sep 11)
- Re: MD5 is slow Thomas Bellman via NANOG (Sep 11)