Re: BGP Security Intelligence Platform – Feedback Requested

[bogdancyber via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org>]

In my documents, I stated that “shorter, consistent AS_PATHs propagate more effectively” and that AS_PATH lengths 
influence route preference. To be precise:

BGP Route Selection and AS_PATH

According to RFC 4271, Section 9 (BGP Route Selection Process):

"Remove from consideration all routes that are not tied for having the smallest number of AS numbers present in their 
AS_PATH attributes"

This means that, when local preference, MED, origin type, and other selection criteria are equal, BGP will prefer the 
route with the shorter AS_PATH.

Clarification on “propagation” and “credibility”

I do not mean that AS_PATH length directly affects the credibility of the origin or guarantees propagation. It was a 
mistake in expression that I take responsibility for.

Actual propagation is determined by operator filtering policies, RPKI/ROA validation, and peer relationships.

What I intended to highlight in the tool is that shorter AS_PATHs may indicate routes more likely to be selected 
internally within a network, which indirectly informs risk modeling of high-impact BGP hijacks.
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