nanog mailing list archives

Re: ASN "Hijacked"


From: Mike via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org>
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 13:57:35 -0700

Matt,

    Excellent application of Hanlon's Razor - "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity"

    Wish more ops could learn to embrace same.

    $0.02

Mike

On 9/14/26 07:28, Matt Brennan via NANOG wrote:
I'm not willing to say that it's intentional, or malicious, as I don't have
the evidence to back that up.

However, considering the same thing is happening to at least 2 different
ASNs, and when they fixed mine it didn't fix the other ... IMO the best
case scenario is that it's an inexperienced network engineer making a lot
of mistakes.

As I review the list of peers they have, there are several which don't make
obvious sense for a Brazilian telecom company. I'm betting it's more than
2, and the others just haven't realized it yet.

-Matt


On Sat, 12 Sept 2026 at 18:36, Dan Mahoney <danm () prime gushi org> wrote:

Any chance this was a digit-flip from an existing legit peer?  It happens
to the best of us.

-Dan

On Sep 12, 2026, at 3:32 PM, Matt Brennan via NANOG <
nanog () lists nanog org> wrote:
Hi Folks,

  After filing abuse tickets with a few of their upstreams, I received an
email today (from a different contact than the abuse contact) apologizing
and telling me the issue has been resolved. I am not seeing my ASN in
their
peering anymore, so it does appear to be resolved.

  Ryan -- I still see yours in their list. If you want the email address
of
who apologized to me let me know and I'll provide it off-list.

  Thanks again, everyone, for the advice.

-Matt

On Fri, 11 Sept 2026 at 17:51, Bryton Herdes <bryton () cloudflare com>
wrote:
Hey Matt -

We're not receiving those routes from them over peering, and it looks
like
they're not propagating widely to their upstreams or peers.
I checked today's RIB dumps, and see the routes in RouteViews (amsix,
ix-br.gru, saopaulo), only with paths "271253 27421" and "1000 27421"
from
their own peer IPs toward the collectors. I'm not sure what they (or
someone else) have done, but maybe they're just sharing these routes
with
collectors (fingers crossed!).

I'll send you the dumps I grabbed separately via email, and can give
you a
couple of LINK contacts if you don't already have them.

--
Bryton Herdes
Principal Network Engineer
AS13335 - Cloudflare


On Fri, Sep 11, 2026 at 3:24 PM Matt Brennan <brennanma () gmail com>
wrote:
Thanks, everyone, for the feedback. FYI we do have ROA set up for our
prefixes, and I set up ASPA earlier this week hoping it might help
this ...
situation.

After reviewing Ryan's note, I reviewed the list of their peers further
and I feel like a number of them are likely hijacked. I have now
reached
out to who I am confident are upstreams of them (HE, Cogent, Level3)
and
we'll see where that gets me. Of course, with more than 5,000 alleged
peers
this could easily be a zero sum game.

@Bryton -- as a note, both of the upstream ASs are peering with you as
well, but your abuse form doesn't really have an option for this type
of
submission.

-Matt

On Fri, 11 Sept 2026 at 16:06, Bryton Herdes via NANOG <
nanog () lists nanog org> wrote:

b) resolve AS-SET into an ASN tree

c) prune from the tree ASPA violating branches
I've discussed this with a few people with the same ideas, and I can
think
of few reasons not to ship it as long as it's done right.

It is appealing to get some value from the ASPAs as early as possible,
and
pruning bad members from an expanded AS-SET tree could offer that.

--
Bryton Herdes
Principal Network Engineer
AS13335 - Cloudflare


On Fri, Sep 11, 2026 at 11:58 AM Saku Ytti via NANOG <
nanog () lists nanog org>
wrote:

On Fri, 11 Sept 2026 at 18:04, Christopher Hawker via NANOG
<nanog () lists nanog org> wrote:

I would look at creating ASPAs objects with $rir in the first
instance.
Would help combat these sorts of issues :)
Ask your upstream to create objects, then ask them to ask their
upstreams, and so on… You get the picture.

If someone feels like vibing, may I suggest.

a) recover AS-SET <-> ASN relation
    - look at RIR data, check if (mp-)export has exactly one AS-SET ->
match
    - look at peeringDB

b) resolve AS-SET into an ASN tree

c) prune from the tree ASPA violating branches

d) return prefix-list, and origin ASN list


This way anyone already doing RIR prefix-list generation, without any
ASPA support in NOS, could get a significant amount of ASPA benefits
without changing anything in the NOS side, just changing command they
call to translate customer AS-SET into prefix-list or AS origin list
or both.

--
  ++ytti
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