oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: libdbus hardening
From: Solar Designer <solar () openwall com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 18:07:03 +0400
On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 03:58:46PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
On 07/10/2012 03:43 PM, Solar Designer wrote:We already have __secure_getenv() in glibc, which I think is what libraries like this should be using on systems with glibc.Sebastian's patches also include a check on prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE). I'm not sure if the libc approach (compare effective and real UIDs/GIDs on process start and base process environment trust decisions on that) is equivalent.
glibc also uses AT_SECURE. PR_GET_DUMPABLE catches the extra case of a process that started e.g. as root and has since switched creds, but do we actually want to restrict processing of env vars in that case? Perhaps not, and so AT_SECURE is more appropriate. Alexander
Current thread:
- libdbus hardening Sebastian Krahmer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Florian Weimer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Solar Designer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Florian Weimer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Solar Designer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Sebastian Krahmer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Solar Designer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening yersinia (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Sebastian Krahmer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Solar Designer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Sebastian Krahmer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Solar Designer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Florian Weimer (Jul 11)
- Re: libdbus hardening Florian Weimer (Jul 10)
- Re: libdbus hardening Tomas Hoger (Sep 13)
- Re: libdbus hardening Sebastian Krahmer (Jul 11)
