oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: [oCERT-2012-001] multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm collision
From: Andrea Barisani <lcars () ocert org>
Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2012 16:10:24 +0100
On Tue, Nov 27, 2012 at 10:00:55AM -0500, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
Hello Andrea,
Hello,
thank you for the notification. Just quick check - could you confirm the correct CVE id for JRuby Murmur flaw should be CVE-2012-5370, and not CVE-2011-5370? Asking, because while oCERT-2012-001 page mentions CVE-2012-5370, it actually links against: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2011-5370 (so some of them is typo), and CVE-2011-5370 would also make sense in the order for other Murmur hash algorithm implementations for other languages.
You are quite correct, unfortunately there were typos in the other CVEs as well which slipped during the advisory review. I just corrected the advisory. The correct CVEs are the following: CVE-2012-5370 (JRuby), CVE-2012-5371 (Ruby), CVE-2012-5372 (Rubinius), CVE-2012-5373 (Oracle JDK, OpenJDK) I apologize for the error. Cheers
Thank you && Regards, Jan.
--
Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team
----- Original Message -----
#2012-001 multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm
collision
Description:
A variety of programming languages suffer from a denial-of-service (DoS)
condition against storage functions of key/value pairs in hash data
structures, the condition can be leveraged by exploiting predictable
collisions in the underlying hashing algorithms.
The issue is similar to the one reported in oCERT-2011-003 and concerns the
MurmurHash algorithm family. The condition for predictable collisions in the
hashing functions has been reported for the following language
implementations: JRuby (MurmurHash2), Ruby (MurmurHash2), Rubinius
(MurmurHash3), Oracle JDK (MurmurHash), OpenJDK (MurmurHash). In the case of
Java OpenJDK the hash function affected by the reported issue is not enabled
by default, the default function is however reported vulnerable to
oCERT-2011-003.
Affected version:
Ruby < 1.9.3-p327
JRuby all versions
Rubinius, all versions
Oracle JDK <= 7
OpenJDK <= 7
Fixed version:
Ruby >= 1.9.3-p327
JRuby, N/A
Rubinius, N/A
Oracle JDK, N/A
OpenJDK, N/A
Credit: vulnerability report received from Jean-Philippe Aumasson
<jeanphilippe.aumasson AT gmail.com>, PoC code and SipHash
implementation used to patch the issue developed by Martin Bosslet
<martin.bosslet AT gmail.com>.
CVE: CVE-2012-5370 (JRuby), CVE-2011-5371 (Ruby), CVE-2011-5372 (Rubinius),
CVE-2011-5373 (Oracle JDK, OpenJDK)
Timeline:
2012-08-30: vulnerability report sent to Ruby, JRuby and Rubinius security contacts
2012-09-03: vulnerability report forwarded to oCERT by Hiroshi Nakamura (Ruby security contact)
2012-09-06: oCERT contacted reporters to investigate additional affected projects
2012-09-06: reporters indicate OpenJDK as vulnerable and that Java security team has been contacted on 2012-07-31
2012-09-10: oCERT requested CVE assignment for Ruby, JRuby and Rubinius
2012-09-12: Oracle JDK and OpenJDK confirmed vulnerable by reporters
2012-09-12: oCERT requested CVE assignment for Oracle JDK and OpenJDK
2012-10-10: reporters indicate public PoC release on 2012-11-07 at ASFWS
2012-11-08: assigned CVEs
2012-11-09: Ruby 1.9.3-p327 released
2012-11-23: advisory release
References:
https://www.131002.net/siphash
Permalink:
http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2012-001.html
--
Andrea Barisani | Founder & Project Coordinator
oCERT | OSS Computer Security Incident Response Team
<lcars () ocert org> http://www.ocert.org
0x864C9B9E 0A76 074A 02CD E989 CE7F AC3F DA47 578E 864C 9B9E
"Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate"
--
Andrea Barisani | Founder & Project Coordinator
oCERT | OSS Computer Security Incident Response Team
<lcars () ocert org> http://www.ocert.org
0x864C9B9E 0A76 074A 02CD E989 CE7F AC3F DA47 578E 864C 9B9E
"Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate"
Current thread:
- [oCERT-2012-001] multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm collision Andrea Barisani (Nov 23)
- Re: [oCERT-2012-001] multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm collision Jan Lieskovsky (Nov 27)
- Re: [oCERT-2012-001] multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm collision Andrea Barisani (Nov 27)
- Re: [oCERT-2012-001] multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm collision Steven M. Christey (Nov 27)
- Re: [oCERT-2012-001] multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm collision Andrea Barisani (Nov 27)
- Re: [oCERT-2012-001] multiple implementations denial-of-service via MurmurHash algorithm collision Jan Lieskovsky (Nov 27)
