Re: upstream source code authenticity checking

[Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des () des no>]

Kurt Seifried <kseifried () redhat com> writes:
> Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des () des no> writes:
> > This is exactly the logic used by web browsers to justify scaring
> > users away from https sites that haven't payed the Verisign tax...
> Huh? That makes no sense. There's at least one free CA that has a root
> cert in most browsers (http://cert.startcom.org/). I'm sorry but your
> comment in this context doesn't appear to make any sense.

I wasn't aware of StartCom.  I've been using CACert, which is not
included in browsers.

My point was that browsers go to great lengths to prevent users from
visiting sites that use self-signed certificates, or certificates signed
by a CA which the browser does not know / trust, but will happily let
users submit forms on unencrypted sites without even a warning.  This is
the same "no security is better than imperfect security" logic.

DES
-- 
Dag-Erling Smørgrav - des () des no