oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: KDE Paste Applet
From: Michael Samuel <mik () miknet net>
Date: Wed, 26 Jun 2013 14:39:49 +1000
On 13 June 2013 10:02, Michael Samuel <mik () miknet net> wrote:
Ok, so the fix for this uses KRandom::random()... I suggest leaving the KDE Paste fix as-is and replacing KRandom with something that just fills an integer from /dev/urandom - then we can save a few CVE numbers for the rest of the year. qrand() should probably also do the same, especially since cnonces for HTTP auth are using it - that means there's only 2^32 (at best) possible cnonces...
Fedora and Ubuntu have both pushed out this patch. Requesting a new CVE for "KRandom::random() isn't a secure PRNG", since the KDE guys are convinced that it is. Regards, Michael
Current thread:
- KDE Paste Applet Michael Samuel (May 28)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Kurt Seifried (May 29)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Michael Samuel (May 30)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Jeff Mitchell (May 31)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Michael Samuel (Jun 12)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Michael Samuel (Jun 25)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Kurt Seifried (Jun 25)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Garth Mollett (Jun 26)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Michael Samuel (May 30)
- Re: KDE Paste Applet Kurt Seifried (May 29)
