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Re: CVE Request: BusyBox tar directory traversal


From: Robert Watson <robertcwatson1 () gmail com>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 03:01:46 -0400

If the user unpacking the tar does not have write access to the target
directory of the symlink, won't the write of that file fail?

If the unpacking user *does* have write access to the symlink target
directory, but the file already exists in that directory, however the user
does not have write-access to that file, won't the write fail then as well?

A common use-case for tar is writing to a single directory and below as you
say. But it is by no means the only capability.

Remember that tar was created primarily for software distribution and
compressed tar files are most often used to this day for that purpose.
Software distribution almost always involves writing files to many
different directories at all levels of the filesystem. Symlinks between
them are quite common as well.

What am I misunderstanding?




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On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:15 AM, Tim Brown <tmb () 65535 com> wrote:

On Thursday 22 October 2015 22:40:29 Robert Watson wrote:
Apologies if I'm naive but... since /tmp is world writable, how is this a
vulnerability?

The permissions on /tmp having nothing at all to do with this, not sure why
you brought that up. With most archiving tools, there is an expectation
that
unpacking will involve writing only to the current directory and below
and/or
a user specified directory and below. This breaks that assumption because
the
unpacker may create a symlink to a location outside of the directory which
later may then be followed when further files are unpacked. Depending on
the
user permissions, this could lead to sensitive files being overwritten.
Even if
the unpacker validates the path it is writing to is as described, the
validation fails to account for the potential presence of symbolic link
files
that point elsewhere.

Tim
--
Tim Brown
<mailto:tmb () 65535 com>

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