oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714
From: Bob Friesenhahn <bfriesen () simple dallas tx us>
Date: Thu, 19 May 2016 14:51:58 -0500 (CDT)
On Thu, 19 May 2016, Simon McVittie wrote:
Having looked into it a bit for Debian, there are several factors: * mitigations exist, like you said
The problem is that most users don't know about the problem, the mitigations, or are even aware that they are using the software. They do know about periodic application of security updates.
Regarding the comments from Kurt Seifried about the supposed perils of MVG:
Unless ImageMagick is configured to use RSVG (as it often is), then it will use its own built in SVG renderer by default (the built in one is still available with a "MSVG:" prefix to the filename or possibly the file extension). The SVG renderer operates by translating the SVG into MVG, including the URLs. The translation is not secure in that arbitrary MVG may be injected via SVG through text strings. SVG is a common file exchange format found on the web and often opened outside of web browsers.
* many of the upstream fixes in ImageMagick (and GraphicsMagick) are really just mitigations too, and they remove features that someone could conceivably have been using, which rather goes against the idea of a stable release with a fixed feature-set
Agreed.
Bob, if you would like distributions to pick up GraphicsMagick security fixes in a timely way, it would probably be really useful to do an upstream release - distributions are typically a lot more confident about
I do plan to make a release, but want to make sure that the release is of no less quality than other releases. I want to remove the current render/MVG "mitigation" regarding magick-specific syntax and provide a "safer" operating mode which protects against magick-specific syntax when it is used for formats with expected behavior like SVG. The "safer" mode may have general purpose value outside of MVG.
Bob -- Bob Friesenhahn bfriesen () simple dallas tx us, http://www.simplesystems.org/users/bfriesen/ GraphicsMagick Maintainer, http://www.GraphicsMagick.org/
Current thread:
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714, (continued)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Tim (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Brandon Dees (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Seth Arnold (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Seth Arnold (May 03)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Jeremy Stanley (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Kurt Seifried (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Simon McVittie (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 John Lightsey (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Bob Friesenhahn (May 20)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Simon Lees (May 20)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Thomas Klausner (May 19)
- Re: ImageMagick Is On Fire -- CVE-2016-3714 Sven Kieske (May 20)
