Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files

[Adam Shannon <adamkshannon () gmail com>]

metasploit has had such a check available for a while now.

https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/backup_file.rb

On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Solar Designer <solar () openwall com> wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 02:35:59PM +0100, Jakub Wilk wrote:
> > There's another problem with vim swapfiles.
> >
> > If you edit a file directly in /tmp, vim will happily read a swapfile
> > that were planted there by somebody else. Local users could exploit this
> > for denial of service (or maybe worse if there are any swapfile parsing
> > bugs...).
> >
> > Is that a bug in vim? Or is it a user error to edit file directly in
> > /tmp?
>
> Almost all manual uses of /tmp are user errors, yet we could want to
> harden programs to make such misuses less risky.
>
> > In the latter case, we should fix at least vipe(1) and vidir(1) from
> > moreutils; and run-mailcap(1).
>
> Alexander