oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: linux-distros application for CentOS Project's Hyperscale SIG


From: Michel Lind <michel () michel-slm name>
Date: Tue, 23 Jul 2024 15:44:01 -0500

Hi Alexander,

On Tue, Jul 23, 2024 at 09:23:10PM +0200, Solar Designer wrote:
Hi,

I've finally reviewed the links and re-read the thread.  Looks like
we're OK to proceed with adding CentOS Project's Hyperscale SIG as a
linux-distros member.

Michel, please e-mail me off-list with PGP keys for all of you who need
to be subscribed for Hyperscale.  I also need to know who will be
managing this subscription on your end (informing me of any changes in
who's to stay subscribed).

Thank you! I'll email once I have collected all the keys.

On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 06:54:13PM -0500, Michel Lind wrote:
All three of us are Fedora developers - but AIUI, we will not and can not use
membership here to contribute Fedora patches - until the embargo is
over.

For Hyperscale itself we plan to use the head start to have local builds
ready to go, and commit and do a public build as soon as the embargo is
over; if it needs collaboration we can use private Git repos and E2EE
private chats to discuss the fix among ourselves.

This is, to the best of my knowledge, similar to how AlmaLinux handles
embargoed security issues - the fix is ready to go but is only made
available once the embargo is lifted.

Now - wearing our Fedora hats, we certainly would try and help get this
fixed in Fedora once the embargo is over (as we've done before) - and
knowing a CVE is going to be made public would certainly help (e.g.
trying to make sure one of us is around) - but we won't be participating
in the list wearing our Fedora hat, or discuss embargoed issues with
people not on the list.

This understanding is correct.  The membership and embargoed info is
only for the specific distro "except with the reporter's explicit
approval".  This exception means that you may occasionally ask whoever
reported the issue to linux-distros for permission to use the
information e.g. also for preparing a fix for Fedora even though you're
subscribed for Hyperscale.  To avoid miscoordination, please keep such
requests also CC'ed to the list.  Uses of this exception have been very
rare so far, and it is expected that you wouldn't use it often, or else
it'd make more sense to discuss the additional distro becoming a member.

Thanks. Good to know this exception exists, but I'm hoping to prod
Fedora to onboard itself as a member anyway.

FWIW, Fedora's fix for CVE-2024-6387 was quite timely as-is:

commit dcbca7b947cf82c30d6f477a26efd2f765204fe6
Author:     Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer () gmail com>
AuthorDate: Mon Jul 1 20:49:16 2024 -0700
Commit:     Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer () gmail com>
CommitDate: Tue Jul 2 00:48:16 2024 -0700

    Patch 9.6p1 for CVE-2024-6387

* Mon Jul 01 2024 Gordon Messmer <gordon.messmer () gmail com> - 9.6p1-12
- Patch 9.6p1 for CVE-2024-6387

On one hand, this confirms that Fedora cares.  On the other, for an
issue with a trivial patch, I don't know if Fedora could have done much
or anything more to prepare.

It was timely .. but there was some scramble in Fedora's security room
the morning the embargo was lifted. It turns out the development Rawhide
branch was not in a buildable state at that moment - not a big deal, I
pointed out at the time that it's more important to fix the stable
releases - but with access to the embargo, someone could have fixed the
Rawhide build in preparation I suppose.

OpenSSH 9.8 released on July 1 also fixed "Logic error in ssh(1)
ObscureKeystrokeTiming", which became CVE-2024-39894 by July 3:

https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/03/6

Per upstream, this issue affects "9.5 through 9.7 (inclusive)", so I
guess Fedora's package based on 9.6p1 is vulnerable.  There doesn't
appear to be a fix in the package yet.  I see this is being tracked in:

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2295615

which is assigned to Dmitry Belyavskiy, who is also the maintainer of
the OpenSSH package in RHEL and CentOS Stream.  RHEL is not affected and
the issue is low severity, so will probably take a long while to fix in
Fedora via Red Hat.  Maybe something the community could do quicker?
This is not directly related to possible linux-distros membership; this
issue wasn't even on linux-distros.

Yeah - the CVE fixes were done by a non-maintainer anyway (Dmitry
understandably has his hands full with fixing RHEL and CentOS Stream).
This is tangential - but having a well-coordinated security team in
Fedora, that participates in this list and in linux-distros, would
likely help - e.g. by ensuring that the ACL of key packages like openssh
correlates to who often contributes to it, and by making sure issues
like these get addressed sooner rather than later.

-- 
 _o) Michel Lind
_( ) identities: https://keyoxide.org/5dce2e7e9c3b1cffd335c1d78b229d2f7ccc04f2

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