oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: uutils coreutils CVEs
From: Jakub Wilk <jwilk () jwilk net>
Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 12:08:44 +0200
* Collin Funk <collin.funk1 () gmail com>, 2026-05-01 18:49:
* CVE-2026-35352We can see that uutils 'mkfifo' creates the fifo with world readable and writable permissions and then uses chmod() which introduces a TOCTOU race that can be exploited by another user creating a symbolic link in it's place:$ mkfifo --version mkfifo (uutils coreutils) 0.8.0 $ strace mkfifo -m 700 /tmp/fifo [...] umask(000) = 002 umask(002) = 000 mknodat(AT_FDCWD, "/tmp/fifo", S_IFIFO|0666) = 0 chmod("/tmp/fifo", 0700) = 0
Creating the FIFO with default permission could allow other users to open it before the chmod(..., 0700) call. This is indeed a vulnerability, but unrelated to symlinks, and it's a different issue than the one in the description of CVE-2026-35352:
A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists in the mkfifo utility of uutils coreutils. The utility creates a FIFO and then performs a path-based chmod to set permissions. A local attacker with write access to the parent directory can swap the newly created FIFO for a symbolic link between these two operations.
Note that this attack doesn't work in /tmp, because the sticky bit prevents the attacker from deleting or renaming other users' files. The victim would have to do something like "mkfifo /home/mallory/fifo". So, uh, don't do that?
It's questionable if this is a vulnerability at all. -- Jakub Wilk
Current thread:
- uutils coreutils CVEs Collin Funk (May 02)
- Re: uutils coreutils CVEs Jan Schaumann (May 02)
- Re: uutils coreutils CVEs Jakub Wilk (May 04)
- Re: uutils coreutils CVEs cyber security (May 04)
- Re: uutils coreutils CVEs Eli Schwartz (May 04)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: uutils coreutils CVEs Collin Funk (May 02)
