Re: CVE-2026-9641: Crypt::PBKDF2 versions before 0.261630 for Perl have a weak default algorithm and number of iterations

[Peter Gutmann <pgut001 () cs auckland ac nz>]

Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 () gmail com> writes:

> Does the shorter output length (128 bits for MD5; 160 bits for SHA-1) cause
> problems?  Has the general advance of computing power caught up to HMAC-MD5
> and HMAC-SHA1, or do they remain secure? (Similar to how DES remains unbroken
> in the cryptanalytic sense, but its 56-bit keyspace is now vulnerable to
> brute force.)

Anything above around 2^110 is computationally infeasible for the indefinite
future (for reference, the entire global Bitcoin hash rate is 2^94 per year).

Peter.