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CVE-2026-46453: Apache Camel: Camel-Elasticsearch-Rest-Client: Exchange header constants without the Camel prefix bypass inbound HTTP header filtering, allowing untrusted clients to override the Elasticsearch query and operation
From: Andrea Cosentino <acosentino () apache org>
Date: Sun, 05 Jul 2026 12:03:15 +0000
Severity: moderate
Affected versions:
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-elasticsearch-rest-client) 4.3.0 before 4.14.8
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-elasticsearch-rest-client) 4.15.0 before 4.18.3
- Apache Camel (org.apache.camel:camel-elasticsearch-rest-client) 4.19.0 before 4.21.0
Description:
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel ElasticSearch
Rest Client.
The camel-elasticsearch-rest-client component reads several Exchange headers to control its behaviour - SEARCH_QUERY
(an advanced query body), OPERATION (which Elasticsearch operation to run), INDEX_NAME, INDEX_SETTINGS and ID. The
string values of these header constants, defined in ElasticSearchRestClientConstant, are plain unprefixed names
('SEARCH_QUERY', 'OPERATION', 'INDEX_NAME', 'INDEX_SETTINGS', 'ID') rather than the 'Camel'-prefixed names used by
every other Camel component (for example CamelSqlQuery, CamelMongoDbCriteria, CamelCqlQuery). Camel's inbound HTTP
header filter, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy, blocks only header names that begin with 'Camel' or 'camel'. Because the
Elasticsearch header names do not carry that prefix, they pass through the inbound filter unchanged. When a Camel route
exposes an HTTP entry point (for example platform-http) in front of an elasticsearch-rest-client producer, an untrusted
HTTP client can set these headers directly on its request and override the query and operation that the route author
configured: reading every document in the index (SEARCH_QUERY with a match_all query), deleting documents (OPERATION
set to Delete together with ID), or exfiltrating selected fields. No credentials are required and the producer reads
the headers unconditionally.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.3.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases
stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are
suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix renames the camel-elasticsearch-rest-client Exchange header constant string
values (ID, SEARCH_QUERY, INDEX_SETTINGS, INDEX_NAME, OPERATION) to carry the Camel prefix (CamelElasticsearchId,
CamelElasticsearchSearchQuery, CamelElasticsearchIndexSettings, CamelElasticsearchIndexName,
CamelElasticsearchOperation) so that they are blocked by the inbound HttpHeaderFilterStrategy; the Java field names are
unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the affected headers from untrusted inbound messages
before they reach the producer (for example removeHeader('SEARCH_QUERY'), removeHeader('OPERATION'),
removeHeader('INDEX_NAME'), removeHeader('INDEX_SETTINGS') and removeHeader('ID') in front of the
elasticsearch-rest-client endpoint), or apply a custom HeaderFilterStrategy that blocks these names.
Credit:
Yu Bao from Paypal (finder)
References:
https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-46453.html
https://camel.apache.org/
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-46453
Current thread:
- CVE-2026-46453: Apache Camel: Camel-Elasticsearch-Rest-Client: Exchange header constants without the Camel prefix bypass inbound HTTP header filtering, allowing untrusted clients to override the Elasticsearch query and operation Andrea Cosentino (Jul 05)
