oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Vulnerabilities in libheif and libde265
From: Hanno Böck <hanno () hboeck de>
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 09:22:01 +0200
libheif has released another update with various security fixes: https://github.com/strukturag/libheif/releases/tag/v1.23.5 Pasting the relevant part of the release notes below. I believe this from the project's README is also relevant: "Project status (September 2026). libheif and libde265 are maintained by a single independent developer with almost no recurring funding, while 61 security advisories had to be investigated, fixed and released in 2026 alone." ------------------- v1.23.5 is a security and bugfix release. It is ABI- and API-compatible with v1.23.4 and is a drop-in replacement. One of the fixed issues is rated high, so all users are advised to upgrade. Security fixes (CVE numbers will be added when assigned.) CVE-2026-XXXXX (GHSA-v8qw-hwjv-44hw) Memory exhaustion through a mismatch between the container and the bitstream image size. A crafted image can declare a small size in its ispe property while the bitstream declares a much larger coded frame. The container-level checks used the ispe size, so the oversized bitstream reached the decoder, which allocated a frame buffer for the in-band size before libheif rejected the mismatch. The advisory demonstrated this for AV1 with the libaom backend (a 351-byte AVIF declaring 64x64 but coding up to 27648x27648, allocating hundreds of MB to more than 10 GB), but the same class affects every codec whose real frame size lives in the bitstream. The coded size is now checked against max_image_size_pixels in the codec-independent decode path, before any bytes reach a decoder plugin: all AV1 sequence headers, all HEVC/AVC/VVC SPS NAL units (including those carried in the item data, not only the ones in the configuration record), the JPEG SOF marker and the JPEG 2000 SIZ reference grid are scanned for the largest coded size. (high) CVE-2026-XXXXX (GHSA-qwpf-5wf7-r996) Heap use-after-free and double free when encoding an image that carries a TAI timestamp, including transcoding a file with an itai property. ImageDescription shallow-copied its raw heif_tai_timestamp_packet pointer, and a temporary in ImageItem::encode_to_bitstream_and_boxes() freed the packet while the item and the source image still held it. The timestamp is now stored by value. (medium) CVE-2026-XXXXX (GHSA-9c75-9g8r-4728) Memory amplification through a JPEG 2000 pclr box declaring zero palette columns. The entry-count bound was skipped for zero columns, so an 11-byte box allocated 65,535 empty palette entries, and nested j2kH containers could repeat this within the child and nesting limits: a 3 KB file reached about 330 MB RSS, none of it charged to max_total_memory. Zero columns are rejected (ISO/IEC 15444-1 requires 1 to 255), the byte bound is unconditional, and the palette storage is charged to the memory limits. (medium) CVE-2026-XXXXX (GHSA-r7gr-2xm2-23wf) Heap out-of-bounds read in alpha compositing for uncompressed (unci) images whose colour planes have different bit depths. Op_flatten_alpha_plane read every plane through the sample type of the first colour plane, so an 8-bit blue plane next to 16-bit red and green planes was read with a halved stride past its end, and the bytes ended up in the composited output. ColorState now tracks one bit depth per plane, and the operator declines mixed sample widths at planning time. (medium) CVE-2026-XXXXX (GHSA-q492-cfcm-895h) The OpenJPEG decoder plugin's pre-decode size check bounded the JPEG 2000 window span (x1-x0)*(y1-y0) but not the absolute reference-grid coordinates, so a codestream with a 17-pixel window on a grid near the 32-bit boundary reached opj_decode(). Against OpenJPEG 2.3.1 this produced a heap-buffer-overflow write inside OpenJPEG (the class of CVE-2020-6851); OpenJPEG 2.5.4 rejects the input. The reference-grid area is now bounded as well. (low) (GHSA-qfj5-c4pq-q998) Heap out-of-bounds read in the uncompressed encoder when an application attached a separate alpha plane to an image with an interleaved chroma format. The interleaved encoders took their component list from the chroma format (three entries) but decided whether to write alpha from the presence of an alpha plane, and indexed the list at [3]. heif_image_add_plane() now rejects a separate alpha plane on interleaved images, and the encoders derive both decisions from the chroma format. Only reachable through the public API; decoding never produces such an image. (low) (GHSA-7pwf-qh74-p35w) The caller's heif_security_limits were not applied when parsing a mini box (the MIAF minimized image format) or the av1C/hvcC blob embedded in it; the built-in defaults were used instead. An application that tightened the limits got no enforcement of its max_memory_block_size or max_total_memory on such files. The allocations are bounded by the bytes present in the box, so this could not amplify memory use. (low) Thanks to @homm, @jitxie (Yunding Lab, Tencent Security), @peter-hendy, @joelczk, @adamyordan, @k3mlol, @bruhdev1290 and @hyunjungdoh for reporting these issues, and to @SomnathDas, @sil3ntwizard and @iceray00 for the reports behind the API-contract and UBSan items under Hardening. Hardening Colour conversion tracks one bit depth per plane instead of one image-wide value, and every operator declares the sample width and the per-plane depths it can read, so images with mixed plane depths (which unci allows) are declined at planning time instead of being caught, or not, by runtime checks. The blanket check that refused every mixed-depth YCbCr conversion (GHSA-w7mc-p8jc-p853) is replaced by per-operator constraints The colour-conversion and encoder entry points verify the plane layout: the planes that an image's colorspace and chroma format imply must be present exactly once, at the implied sizes. Missing, duplicate or foreign planes previously failed deep inside an operator, passed through as a no-op, or hit an assert() in the x265 plugin that release builds compile out heif_image_add_plane() rejects a Cb or Cr plane whose size does not match the chroma subsampling of the image. An oversized plane built this way fooled the row fill in heif_image_extend_to_size_fill_with_zero() into a 4 GB out-of-bounds write (GHSA-j2rv-58fh-w8pw), an undersized one caused out-of-bounds reads in the RGB conversion (#1796). Only reachable by an application constructing an inconsistent image through the public API heif_image_extend_to_size_fill_with_zero() rejects a target smaller than the current image with a usage error instead of underflowing the fill length and writing past the plane (GHSA-hqc2-cx5m-g6ff, only reachable by out-of-contract API use) memcpy() is never called with a NULL pointer, even for zero-length copies (empty box payloads, zero-length iloc extents, empty ICC profiles or masks). This is undefined behaviour in C17 and C++ and was reported by UBSan (GHSA-2764-mqj2-c458, GHSA-x8qp-vqp7-mm4r) JPEG 2000 pclr: the palette precision field is read and written as the specification defines it (the low 7 bits hold the precision minus one), and the entry count is returned as the 16-bit value it is -- Hanno Böck https://hboeck.de/
Current thread:
- Vulnerabilities in libheif and libde265 Alan Coopersmith (Sep 18)
- Re: Vulnerabilities in libheif and libde265 Hanno Böck (Sep 19)
- Re: Vulnerabilities in libheif and libde265 Hanno Böck (Sep 22)
- Re: Vulnerabilities in libheif and libde265 Hanno Böck (Sep 19)
