oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Information for Python users regarding eMudhra / emSign CA certificate security incident


From: Sam Bull <9m199i () sambull org>
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 15:43:32 +0100

The Python ecosystem is pushing towards using https://pypi.org/project/truststore/ rather
than solutions like certifi. This incident will likely help increase the priority of that
transition.

On Fri, 2026-10-23 at 00:07 +0300, Valtteri Vuorikoski wrote:
Having spent the day whacking this particular molehill, my strong opinion is
that these packages (minus certifi) should stop vendoring roots immediately.

Users should install their distro's ca-certificates package or similar. If that
is completely impossible for whatever reason, offer an option to use certifi
(which should be a dependency, not vendored) - but the system trust store should
be the default source of truth.

This sort of easter egg hiding to serve users with broken installations reduces
the security of everyone else.

(Missing from the quoted list: botocore also includes a vendored copy. I haven't
checked how it's used.)

 -valtteri


On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 01:43:08PM -0700, Alan Coopersmith wrote:
https://discuss.python.org/t/information-for-python-users-regarding-emudhra-emsign-ca-certificate-security-incident/109576
has this statement from Seth Michael Larson:
A security incident affecting eMudhra intermediate certificates has
required removing the emSign root CA certificate from CA bundles such
as “certifi”. It’s important to immediately upgrade the software
packages below to at least the versions specified and rebuild
container images with layer caching disabled to fetch the latest
system certificates. Failure to do so could result in
monster-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against TLS clients, including
python.org and pypi.org .

    certifi 2026.10.19 (1)
    pip 26.2.2
    uv 0.13.4
    sigstore 4.5.1
    conda 26.9.4
    pixi 0.82.1

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