Penetration Testing mailing list archives
Re: [PEN-TEST] Scanning Web Proxy -- Preliminary Concept
From: Philip Stoev <philip () STOEV ORG>
Date: Sat, 16 Dec 2000 00:19:39 +0200
Hello all, Thanks for the constructive feedback. A bunch of tools were pointed to me and I will be examining those closely. However, it seems that most of the tools that are available have been made for the purpose of testing a single site, and this site is more or less expected to be under tester's control, that is, prepared to take hit after hit. I have the following ideas that are different from this approach: 1. The proxy server is not to be used by a single tester, but rather by a group of testers, that each visit as many sites as possible. This allows more sites to be at least somewhat analysed for security vulnerabilities. Imagine that you are a security conscious individual, who likes to browse around in his free time. From time to time, you sense that something in the site you just visited accidentally is wrong and decide to view the HTML source and you see your password in plaintext there. Of course, you will do that only on around one site or so per day, while you visit hundreds of sites. What I want to accomplish is having a proxy server that will view the HTML source and look for that and other vulnerabilities for _each_ and _every_ site you visit, as if you are giving each one a piece of your security-conscious mind. Once the web server sounds an alarm, you will know that you have just visited a badly-coded site and it is justified to stop and view the HTML source yourself and see what is going on. Now imagine that you are not the only one browsing around, but rather it is you and a bunch of your friends. During the day, you all could visit hundreds of sites both together and separately, thus dramatically increasing the chance that somebody will visit a site containing a security vulnerability. In brief, instead of you alone hitting your own server to death with millions of requests, you and your friends will be hitting other peoples' servers (lightly), and then hit to death only those of them that are promising, that is, those that produce warinings from the proxy server during normal browsing. 2. Most of the products I had the chance to read about have a functionality that enables them to do mass requesting on their own, such as trying to brute-force a cookie starting from 1 and ending with 9999999. I think that this may be a good approach, however only if you do it subequently and explicitly, and not as a portion of your everyday browsing through the scanning proxy server. Instead, I would like the scanning proxy server to limit the requests it makes on its own to about five or so per each request the operator makes. For a simple POST of a login form, those additional requests will be: 1) A request with a wrong username and 2) A request with a wrong password - if the replies of 1 and 2 differ, this means the web site allows us to guess a username first, and then guess the password. 3) A request with a ' or " or ; in the username - If the reply differs from 1 and 2, this means that we may have introduced an error in the SQL statement verifying the login, which in turn may allow us to insert our own SQL code in it. If another request-reply pair from the same login form has been recorded in the past, it is to be compared to the present one in order to discover any similarities/differences. Additionally, the old request is to be performed again so that we can also compare the reply from the old request then vs. the reply from the old request now vs. the reply from the new request now. This comparison will allow the proxy server to separate timestamp-related from login-related cookies. Also, it will detect which portions of the cookies are not variable, that is, marking even long cookies as easily brute-forcable if they appear to be static enough. It will be even better if the proxy server has the ability to proxy two login requests with a single username, but with two different, valid passwords. This will enable it to separate username-related cookies from password-related ones. In brief, the purpose is to extract as much information from as little additional requests as possible. There will be no hard-hitting that will make e-commerce sites angry. Once you sense that something is wrong, you are free to hit as much as you like to. The above-mentioned requests are to be performed at each login form we encounter, without the need to define rules and stuff for each one separately.
Current thread:
- [PEN-TEST] Scanning Web Proxy -- Preliminary Concept Philip Stoev (Dec 15)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Scanning Web Proxy -- Preliminary Concept Glenn Williamson (Dec 15)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Scanning Web Proxy -- Preliminary Concept Alex Butcher (Dec 16)
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Scanning Web Proxy -- Preliminary Concept Philip Stoev (Dec 16)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: [PEN-TEST] Scanning Web Proxy -- Preliminary Concept vort-fu (Dec 15)
