FC: Stimson Center replies to accusations it demands gvt censorship

[Declan McCullagh <declan () well com>]

On Tuesday I forwarded a copy of Secrecy News that highlighted what
Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center told Congress should be done about
government chemical data mirrored on private-sector websites:

  Stimson Center demands gvt censorship of chemical-data websites
  http://www.politechbot.com/p-02788.html

Amy's testimony is part of a years-long debate over chemical plant
data. Here's an article I wrote in Feb. 1999:
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17841,00.html

Now Amy is trying (see below) to back away from her testimony, which
you can find here:

http://www.house.gov/transportation/water/11-08-01/smithson.html
> Taking matters into their own hands, certain private interest groups
> have begun presenting on their own websites data gleaned from Risk
> Management Plans and their Off-site Consequence Analyses
> sections... Immediately, these interest groups must cease and desist
> activities that make data on hazardous materials facilities available
> to widespread public view, removing this data from their websites. 
> Failing their voluntary cooperation, the US government should take
> swift steps to close down the pertinent segments of these
> organizations' websites and take legal steps to prohibit them from
> distributing this data in the future on the Internet or by other
> means.

-Declan

---

http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/smithson.html
   
   FAS Note: The following commentary by Amy E. Smithson, Director,
   Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project at the
   Stimson Center responds to an account of her testimony published in
   the FAS newsletter Secrecy News.
     _________________________________________________________________
   
     In the November 13th issue of Secrecy News, Steven Aftergood quoted
     my testimony before the House Transportation and Infrastructure
     Committee's Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment on
     November 8th. The direct quotes I certainly recognized, but the
     accompanying interpretation of my policy recommendations was way
     off course.
     
     In August 2000, the government issued a new regulation governing
     the public availability of the Risk Management Plans of over 15,000
     facilities that deal with amounts of hazardous and extremely
     hazardous chemicals over certain thresholds. One section of this
     document describes scenarios about releases of these dangerous
     chemicals, including information about how such releases could
     happen and how many people would potentially be hurt or killed.
     Some data from the Risk Management Plans, including the executive
     summaries of these scenarios, were subsequently published in
     searchable form on the Environmental Protection Agency's Internet
     site. While the detailed scenarios themselves were not posted on
     the Internet, they remain viewable at reading rooms in each state
     and several US territories. My testimony addressed this specific
     regulatory decision. Mr. Aftergood's editorial neglects this fact,
     painting my comments as a general attack on environmental websites
     that deal with chemical hazard information and their first
     amendment rights.
     
     Without embellishment, Risk Management Plan data could provide a
     veritable roadmap for terrorists or other saboteurs who might wish
     to unleash a chemical disaster without surmounting the considerable
     obstacles of making chemical weapons from scratch. The FBI contends
     that seven of the nine pieces of information needed to target a
     chemical plant are contained in the Offsite Consequence Analysis
     section of these plans. Yet, several environmental and
     right-to-know interest groups have analyzed the Risk Management
     Plan data and broken it down into even more terrorist-helpful
     chunks, conveniently posted on their websites. Defenders of easy
     access to the information in question say they would not knowingly
     assist terrorists. Perhaps then these groups should reconsider
     posting items such as a list of the top 50 facilities nationwide
     from which a chemical release could potentially kill the most
     people. If that isn't a handy terrorist chemical disaster roadmap,
     what is?
     
     As a closer reading of my testimony reveals, I thoroughly respect
     and advocate the public's right to know of the industrial dangers
     in their communities. However, there are better ways in which to
     release information about US chemical plants and enable citizen
     monitoring of their activities. Before the August 2000 regulation
     was implemented, citizens could ask any number of questions about
     local chemical sites and their community's disaster response plans
     and capabilities in meetings of their Local Emergency Planning
     Committees. Not only could they learn more from knowledgeable local
     officials and industry representatives than they could from a sheet
     of paper, citizens could voice concerns and recommendations
     directly to local authorities. This approach is far preferable to
     the current regulatory approach that makes it more convenient to
     access this data but also hands terrorists the information they
     need for their malevolent plots on a silver platter.
     
     Since one can hardly dispute that some terrorist groups are
     determined to harm as many Americans as possible, does convenience
     really outweigh the possible catastrophes that could result from
     Internet and reading room availability of this data? Just as the
     price of better airline security is going to be longer lines at
     airports, so will some reasonable sacrifices have to be made to
     make it more difficult to enable terrorists to use the chemical
     facilities in our midst against us.
     
     Yes, my testimony urged that the EPA's website and reading rooms be
     permanently closed and that the environmental and right-to-know
     groups pull this information from their websites. If not, I believe
     they are placing at risk the very lives that they desire to
     protect. Should these groups refuse to do so voluntarily, I think
     government has a duty to step in and pursue the removal of JUST the
     Risk Management Plan associated data from the sites concerned. Key
     parts of some scenario information have been scanned and posted on
     the Internet. Only a "covered person"-a government official in most
     cases, or a researcher who has applied for access-is supposed to be
     able to have this type of data outside of the reading rooms. Abuse
     of this special status by disseminating this data constitutes a
     criminal act. People and organizations obviously aren't abiding by
     the law and should be held accountable.
     
     In sum, the issue is not IF this information should be accessible,
     but HOW easily people should be able to access it. My testimony
     never advocated general censorship or the blanket withholding of
     this information, only a more careful and considered approach to
     its distribution. Accordingly, Mr. Aftergood's characterization of
     my remarks was simplistic, belittling in places, and most
     importantly, incorrect. While I have no doubt that some may
     continue to disagree with my point of view, an accurate
     understanding of my perspective should be a prerequisite for doing
     so.
     _________________________________________________________________
   



-------------------------------------------------------------------------
POLITECH -- Declan McCullagh's politics and technology mailing list
You may redistribute this message freely if you include this notice.
Declan McCullagh's photographs are at http://www.mccullagh.org/
To subscribe to Politech: http://www.politechbot.com/info/subscribe.html
This message is archived at http://www.politechbot.com/
-------------------------------------------------------------------------