Vulnerability Development mailing list archives
Re: Non registering shell
From: Brian Hatch <vuln-dev () ifokr org>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2003 11:45:15 -0800
I have a question I hope somebody will be able to answer. I am looking for code to build a UNIX shell which is immune to system process listing and or logged by the syslog facility, is this possible? I used to work for a government contractor , and met a UNIX systems programmer who wrote a shell which made his work invisible. Can anyone share info on this?
You mean you want to be able to run commands from a 'magic' shell
and have those commands invisible from ps, top, lsof, etc?
No, this is not possible. The kernel keeps track of all running
processes. (If it didn't, it wouldn't be able to give them access
to system calls, CPU, etc.) The kernel is where process reporting
programs such as ps, top, lsof, and friends get their information
from. You cannot have a shell that 'outfoxes' the kernel.
You can modify the kernel to not report processes if you
* have a loadable kernel module that intercepts process
listing accesses and hides certain processes from the list
* modfify the process reporting structure, such as the
/proc filesystem, to hide these processes
Now someone could determine that a process did exist by using 'kill'
and noting when a non-existant process id returned a 'permission denied'
instead of 'no such process' depending on how the kernel was modified.
One other method could be that you write a shell that modifies the
argv[0] of each child. So instead of calling
"/bin/cat" "cat" "arg1" "arg2" "arg3" ...
you call
"/bin/cat" "sh" "arg1" "arg2" "arg3" ...
to make cat think it's name is 'sh', and the process list will show
'sh' as well.[1] You'll still have an entry in ps (and the arguments
may indicate something is wierd if you saw "sh / -name foo -exec
something {} ;" in ps output, since that's clearly 'find' syntax)
but it won't be immediately obvious if a user just does a ps for
process name, not args.
However this will cause problems for any program that actually checks
argv[0] - for example gzip, gunzip, and zcat are usually the same file
(hardlinks) and it uses argv[0] to determine how it should behave.
The other solution would be to backdoor all your process reporting tools
and hope no one brings along a pristine copy.
So your options are:
* modify kernel very effective
* modify ps/top/etc somewhat effective
* new shell that fudges pretty lame and will break
argv[0] of children some functionality
Now if you were talking about more mundane things like not leaving
a .history file around, that's trivial. Reset the appropriate
env variables (HISTFILE and/or HISTSAVE for example) and they won't
log. To be 'immune' from syslog, use programs that don't send syslogs,
or you could LD_PRELOAD a library that defined openlog, syslog, and
closelog to null functions.
[1] Depending on your OS, you may still be able to learn the real
process name. In Linux, for example, /proc/PID/exe will be
a symlink to the real /bin/cat executable. /proc/PID/stat*
will point out other helpful info too.
--
Brian Hatch Why do "fat chance"
Systems and and "slim chance"
Security Engineer mean the same thing?
www.hackinglinuxexposed.com
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Current thread:
- freeconsole() Mike Mires (Feb 26)
- Re: freeconsole() Oscar Gallego SendÃn (Feb 27)
- Non registering shell Rory Savage (Feb 27)
- Re: Non registering shell Brian Hatch (Feb 27)
- Re: Non registering shell Rory Savage (Feb 28)
- Re: Non registering shell Brian Hatch (Feb 28)
- Re: Non registering shell Brian Hatch (Feb 27)
- Re: freeconsole() sk (Feb 28)
