WebApp Sec mailing list archives
RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL
From: "Michael Silk" <michaels () phg com au>
Date: Fri, 2 Jul 2004 09:50:14 +1000
Hi,
Yes, but assuming that the attacker has gained access to where
the password and hash are stored, he will be able to access the
salt (or algo for salt) anyway.
A potential protection against this form of attack is to totally
slow-down the attacker by, say, hashing the result of your hash
50 times.
In this fashion the attacker would need to call a sha-256 or whatever
hash function 50 times! This would be seriously slow, and (let alone
the size of sha-256) would hopefully rule out the possibility of a
brute-force approach.
-- Michael
-----Original Message-----
From: Dean Saxe [mailto:Dean.Saxe () DigitalInsight com]
Sent: Friday, 2 July 2004 3:35 AM
To: 'Bénoni MARTIN'; Toro, Daniel; Stan Guzik; Dave Andrews;
webappsec () securityfocus com; forensics () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL
Shouldn't a salt value added to the plaintext before hashing effectively
make this kind of a dictionary attack much more difficult, if not
impossible, to perform since you would have to recover the salt and
plaintext?
-dhs
-----Original Message-----
From: Bénoni MARTIN [mailto:Benoni.MARTIN () libertis ga]
Sent: Thursday, July 01, 2004 1:19 PM
To: Toro, Daniel; Stan Guzik; Dave Andrews; webappsec () securityfocus com;
forensics () securityfocus com
Subject: RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL
Well, there is always a way to recover the real password or login from a
hash...the matter's is the time it will take!
The method to "dehash" a hash is quite simple: as theorically a hash_1 can
be produced by a single pass_1/login_1/..., we can create a huge amount of
random pass_2/logins_2/..., hash them with MD5/SHA-1/... and then compare
each of them with our hash_1. ASA the two hashes are the same, we can pick
up the pass/login/... which produced hash_2. Quite simple but really long to
perform.
BTW, Cain & Abel, John the Ripper and Crack can perform such recoveries...
:)
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Current thread:
- Re: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL, (continued)
- Re: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Toro, Daniel (Jul 01)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Bénoni MARTIN (Jul 01)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Yvan Boily (Jul 01)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Dean Saxe (Jul 01)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Bénoni MARTIN (Jul 01)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Mark Curphey (Jul 01)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Dave Andrews (Jul 01)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Philip Wagenaar (Jul 02)
- Re: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Lucas Holt (Jul 06)
- Re: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Ivan Krstic (Jul 06)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Philip Wagenaar (Jul 02)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Michael Silk (Jul 02)
- Re: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL exon (Jul 02)
- RE: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Bénoni MARTIN (Jul 02)
- Re: Securing encrypted data in RAM vs MSSQL Ivan Krstic (Jul 02)
