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Format String Attacks
From: Tim Newsham <tim.newsham () guardent com>
Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2000 11:32:05 -0700
Attached is a whitepaper on format string
attacks. It is presented in Ascii. The full
paper can be found in PDF format on the Guardent
R&D website in the white papers archive at:
tim.newsham () guardent com
Format String Attacks
Copyright (c) 2000. All Rights Reserved
WHAT IS A FORMAT STRING ATTACK?
PRINTF - WHAT THEY FORGOT TO TELL YOU IN SCHOOL
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
X MARKS THE SPOT
The cause and implications of format string vulnerabilities are
discussed. Practical examples are given to illustrate the principles
I know it has happened to you. It has happened to all of us, at one point
or another. You're at a trendy dinner party, and amidst the frenzied
voices of your companions you hear the words "format string attack."
"Format string attack? What is a format string attack?" you ask. Afraid
of having your ignorance exposed among your peers you decide instead to
break an uncomfortable smile and nod in hopes of appearing to be in the-
know. If all goes well, a few cocktails will pass and the conversation
will move on, and no one will be the wiser. Well fear no more! This paper
will cover everything you wanted to know about format string attacks but
were afraid to ask!
----[ WHAT IS A FORMAT STRING ATTACK?
Format string bugs come from the same dark corner as many other security
holes: The laziness of programmers. Somewhere out there right now, as this
document is being read, there is a programmer writing code. His task: to
print out a string or copy it to some buffer. What he means to write is
but instead he decides that he can save time, effort and 6 bytes of source
code by typing:
Why not? Why bother with the extra printf argument and the time it takes
to parse through that silly format? The first argument to printf is a
string to be printed anyway! Because the programmer has just unknowingly
opened a security hole that allows an attacker to control the execution of
the program, that's why!
What did the programmer do that was so wrong? He passed in a string that
he wanted printed verbatim. Instead, the string is interpreted by the
printf function as a format string. It is scanned for special format
characters such as "%d". As formats are encountered, a variable number
of argument values are retrieved from the stack. At the least, it should
be obvious that an attacker can peek into the memory of the program by
printing out these values stored on the stack. What may not be as obvious
is that this simple mistake gives away enough control to allow an
arbitrary value to be written into the memory of the running program.
----[ PRINTF - WHAT THEY FORGOT TO TELL YOU IN SCHOOL
Before getting into the details of how to abuse printf for our own
purposes, we should have a firm grasp of the features printf provides. It
is assumed that the reader has used printf functions before and knows
about its normal formatting features, such as how to print integers and
strings, and how to specify minimum and maximum string widths. In addition
to these more mundane features, there are a few esoteric and little-known
features. Of these features, the following are of particular relevance to
* It is possible to get a count of the number of characters output at
any point in the format string. When the "%n" format is encountered
in the format string, the number of characters output before the %n
field was encountered is stored at the address passed in the next
argument. As an example, to receive the offset to the space between
two formatted numbers:
int pos, x = 235, y = 93;
printf("%d %n%d\n", x, &pos, y);
printf("The offset was %d\n", pos);
* The "%n" format returns the number of characters that should have
been output, not the actual count of characters that were output.
When formatting a string into a fixed-size buffer, the output string
may be truncated. Despite this truncation, the offset returned by
the "%n" format will reflect what the offset would have been if the
string was not truncated. To illustrate this point, the following
code will output the value "100" and not "20":
int pos, x = 0;
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.100d%n", x, &pos);
printf("position: %d\n", pos);
----[ A SIMPLE EXAMPLE
Rather than talking in vagaries and abstractions, we will use a concrete
example to illustrate the principles as they are discussed. The following
simple program will suffice for this purpose:
* Format a value into a fixed-size buffer
main(int argc, char **argv)
if(argc != 2)
x = 1;
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, argv);
buf[sizeof buf - 1] = 0;
printf("buffer (%d): %s\n", strlen(buf), buf);
printf("x is %d/%#x (@ %p)\n", x, x, &x);
A few notes about this program are in order. First, the general purpose
is quite simple: A value passed on the command line is formatted into a
fixed-length buffer. Care is taken to make sure the buffer limits are not
exceeded. After the buffer is formatted, it is output. In addition to
formatting the argument, a second integer value is set and later output.
This variable will be used as the target of attacks later. For now, it
should be noted that its value should always be one.
All examples in this document were actually performed on an x86 BSD/OS 4.1
box. If you have been on a mission to Mozambique for the last 20 years and
are unfamiliar with the x86, it is a little-endian machine. This will be
reflected in the examples when multi-precision numbers are expressed as a
series of byte values. The actual numbers used here will vary from system
to system with differences in architecture, operating system, environment
and even command line length. The examples should be easily adjusted to
work on other x86 machines. With some effort and thought, they may be made
to work on other architectures as well.
----[ FORMAT ME!
It is now time to put on our black hats and start thinking like attackers.
We have in our hands a test program. We know that it has a vulnerability
and we know where the programmer made his mistake. We are also armed with
a thorough knowledge of the printf function and what it can do for us. Let's
get to work by tinkering with our program.
Starting off simple, we invoke the program with normal arguments. Let's
begin with this:
% ./fmtme "hello world"
buffer (11): hello world
x is 1/0x1 (@ 0x804745c)
There's nothing special going on here. The program formatted our string
into the buffer and then printed its length and the value out. It also told
us that the variable x has the value one (shown in decimal and hex) and that
it was stored at the address 0x804745c.
Next lets try providing some format directives. In this example we'll print
out the integers on the stack above the format string:
% ./fmtme "%x %x %x %x"
buffer (15): 1 f31 1031 3133
x is 1/0x1 (@ 0x804745c)
A quick analysis of the program will reveal that the stack layout of the
program when the snprintf function is called is:
Address Contents Description
fp+8 Buffer pointer 4-byte address
fp+12 Buffer length 4-byte integer
fp+16 Format string 4-byte address
fp+20 Variable x 4-byte integer
fp+24 Variable buf 100 characters
The four values output in the previous test were the next four arguments on
the stack after the format string: the variable x, then three 4-byte
taken from the uninitialized buf variable.
Now it is time for an epiphany. As an attacker, we control the values stored
in the buffer. These values are also used as arguments to the snprintf call!
Let's verify this with a quick test:
% ./fmtme "aaaa %x %x"
buffer (15): aaaa 1 61616161
x is 1/0x1 (@ 0x804745c)
Yup! The four 'a' characters we provided were copied to the start of the
buffer and then interpreted by snprintf as an integer argument with the
value 0x61616161 ('a' is 0x61 in ASCII).
----[ X MARKS THE SPOT
All the pieces are falling into place! It is time to step up our attack
from passive probes to actively altering the state of the program.
Remember that variable "x"? Let's try to change its value. To do this, we
will have to enter its address into one of snprintf's arguments. We will
then have to skip over the first argument to snprintf, which is the
variable x, and finally, use a "%n" format to write to the address we
specified. This sounds more complicated than it actually is. An example
should clarify things. [Note: We're using PERL here to execute the program
which allows us to easily place arbitrary characters in the command line
% perl -e 'system "./fmtme", "\x58\x74\x04\x08%d%n"'
buffer (5): X1
x is 5/x05 (@ 0x8047458)
The value of x changed, but exactly what is going on here? The arguments
to snprintf look something like this:
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "\x58\x74\x04\x08%d%n", x, 4 bytes from buf)
At first snprintf copies the first four bytes into buf. Next it scans the
"%d" format and prints out the value of x. Finally it reaches the "%n"
directive. This pulls the next value off the stack, which comes from the
first four bytes of buf. These four bytes have just been filled with
"\x58\x74\x04\x08", or, interpreted as an integer, 0x08047458. Snprintf
then writes the amount of bytes output so far, five, into this address. As
it turns out, that address is the address of the variable x. This is no
coincidence. We carefully chose the value 0x08047458 by previous examination
of the program. In this case, the program was helpful in printing out the
address we were interested in. More typically, this value would have to be
discovered with the aid of a debugger.
Well, great! We can pick an arbitrary address (well, almost arbitrary; as
long as the address contains no NUL characters) and write a value into it.
But can we write a useful value into it? Snprintf will only write out the
number of characters output so far. If we want to write out a small value
greater than four then the solution is quite simple: Pad out the format
string until we get the right value. But what about larger values? Here is
where we take advantage of the fact that "%n" will count the number of
characters that should have been output if there was no truncation:
% perl -e 'system "./fmtme", "\x54\x74\x04\x08%.500d%n"
buffer (99): %0000000 ... 0000
x is 504/x1f8 (@ 0x8047454)
The value that "%n" wrote to x was 504, much larger than the 99 characters
actually emitted to buf. We can provide arbitrarily large values by just
specifying a large field width . And what about small values? We can
construct arbitrary values (even the value zero), by piecing together
several writes. If we write out four numbers at one-byte offsets, we can
construct an arbitrary integer out of the four least-significant bytes. To
illustrate this, consider the following four writes:
Address A A+1 A+2 A+3 A+4 A+5 A+6
Write to A: 0x11 0x11 0x11 0x11
Write to A+1: 0x22 0x22 0x22 0x22
Write to A+2: 0x33 0x33 0x33 0x33
Write to A+3: 0x44 0x44 0x44 0x44
Memory: 0x11 0x22 0x33 0x44 0x44 0x44 0x44
After the four writes are completed, the integer value 0x44332211 is left
in memory at address A, composed of the least-significant byte of the four
writes. This technique gives us flexibility in choosing values to write, but
it does have some drawbacks: It takes four times as many writes to set the
value. It overwrites three bytes neighboring the target address. It also
performs three unaligned write operations. Since some architectures do not
support unaligned writes, this technique is not universally applicable.
----[ SO WHAT?
So what? So what!? SO WHAT!# () ?? So you can write arbitrary values to (almost
any) arbitrary addresses in memory!!! Surely you can think of a good use
for this. Let's see:
* Overwrite a stored UID for a program that drops and elevates
* Overwrite an executed command.
* Overwrite a return address to point to some buffer with shell code in
Put into simpler terms: you OWN the program.
Ok, so what have we learned today?
* printf is more powerful than you previously thought.
* Cutting corners never pays off.
* An innocent looking omission can provide an attacker with just enough
leverage to ruin your day.
* With enough free time, effort, and an input string that looks like the
winning entry in last year's obfuscated-C contest, you can turn
someone's simple mistake into a nationally syndicated news story.
 There is an implementation flaw in printf in certain versions of glibc.
When large field widths are specified, printf will underflow an internal
buffer and cause the program to crash. Because of this, it is not possible
to use field widths larger than several thousand when attacking programs on
certain versions of Linux. As an example, the following code will cause a
segmentation fault on systems with this flaw: printf("%.9999d", 1);
- Format String Attacks Tim Newsham (Sep 12)