Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
RE: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained
From: "robert_david_graham" <robert_david_graham () yahoo com>
Date: Sat, 5 Jan 2002 09:38:51 +0900
Um. Here is some standard free-market economics rhetoric. Marcus will probably kill this because most of you are NOT free-market libertarians (and the thread is already getting long), but here goes... Marcus wrote:
The sad reality is that safety technology only gets applied once it's obvious that the damage from not applying it is extremely expensive to the entire community. Remember - we didn't have mandatory seatbelts in cars until the 1960's and didn't have mandatory shoulder straps until the 1970's. Air bags didn't come until the 1980's and mandatory _use_ laws are only recently on the books in most states. Internationally, the situation is worse. And people have known for a long time that seat belts save lives...
Statistics show that seat belts don't result in lives being saved. Neither do ABS brakes or airbags. Notice my odd phrasing. In a crash, seatbelts/ABS/airbags will certainly help save lives and reduce injuries. However, subconsciously knowing they are safer causes drivers to behave more aggressively, so they get into more crashes. Point studies into ABS breaks and seatbelts confirm this, and industry wide studies of per capita traffic fatalities shows little change over the last 30 years, despite technology, regulation, and adoption of these things (U.S. statistics). Technology doesn't change in a vacuum -- people's behavior changes to compensate. [Offside: if anybody has statistics that disagree with mine showing declining traffic fatality rates, I would love to see them -- it would blow my argument out of the water]. The reason is simple: When it rains and gets dark, people slow down. They are compensating for the increased risk by driving more carefully. Logically, this would imply that when the rain dries and the sun comes out, they start driving more aggressively -- to compensate for the decreased risk. A well-known economist put it another way: remove seatbelts/ABS/airbags and replace with a large metal spike pointed at the driver's chest, and fatality rates are STILL going to be unchanged. Mathematically, drivers calculate that acceptable risk is 0.00001% chance of getting into an accident -- then driver slower/faster to compensate for other factors until that risk is back in balance. Internet security is the same way, and is the reason these problems aren't being solved. Every advance (technology, security educated labor force, etc.) is met by increased risk taking. About half of the firewalls installations I see are of the "drive risky when sun comes out" variety. For example, a company has a backend sales database that is not accessible via the Internet, because it is too risky. A vendor comes in with a firewall/VPN/dual-factor solution, which the vendor uses to put the database on the Internet for their roving sales people. I ask you: was the customer more/less secure before they bought the security products? Less, of course, because now the database is hooked to the Internet. The roving sales person's computer based training program, which silently installs IIS, gets infected, then CodeRed jumps across the VPN tunnel and infects the backend database. The key phrase is: RISK TOLERANCE IS A CONSTANT. This means the level of hacking, worms, viruses, and so forth are a constant. Firewall's don't change risk tolerance. Anti-virus programs don't change risk tolerance. Hiring a security guru won't change your risk tolerance. From Morris to Nimbda, the reason nothing has changed is that corporations have the same risk tolerance today that they had 13 years ago. There is another statistic buried in traffic fatality rates. Traffic deaths PER DRIVEN MILE have indeed gone down dramatically. The reason is the spread of freeways/expressways over the last 50 years. People compensate by driving further, of course, which is why it hasn't impacted overall fatalities PER CAPITA. I point this out because you might interpret my comments above as implying that firewalls/VPNs/auth products are worthless: no, they benefit customers not because they improve security, but because they get to drive longer distances on the infobahn. Presumably, the corporation that put the sales database online is better off -- despite the risk -- than when data was locked in a room somewhere. Applying this Internet wide, the costs of CodeRed and Nimda were certainly considerable, but the BENEFITS of the open, risky architecture far outweighs those costs. Our society is hugely better off because of the Internet technology -- including the increased risks to hacking. As security professionals, we are paid to be pessimists and believe the glass is half-empty. However, economic measurements of GNP growth due to Internet technologies (including costs as well as benefits) indicate a very positive result (that the glass is half-full). Thus, while most of the industry laments at the poor security we have, I think the situation is great: benefits are outweighing the costs. Hacking is an annoyance, but not a "problem". Anyway, this is the standard argument from the free-market economists point of view. I understand that it is NOT the view of most security professionals. Robert Graham _________________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () nfr com http://list.nfr.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Marcus J. Ranum (Jan 03)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Paul D. Robertson (Jan 04)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Richard Johnson (Jan 04)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Ryan Russell (Jan 05)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Frederick M Avolio (Jan 04)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Adam Shostack (Jan 04)
- RE: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained robert_david_graham (Jan 04)
- RE: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Ryan Russell (Jan 05)
- OT: Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Roelof JT Jonkman (Jan 05)
- Re: OT: Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained H. Morrow Long (Jan 06)
- Host Based Packet Filters (was: OT: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained) Robin S. Socha (Jan 06)
- safety of unidirectional NT trusts hermit921 (Jan 15)
- Re: safety of unidirectional NT trusts Jonas Anden (Jan 16)
- Re: safety of unidirectional NT trusts S. Jonah Pressman (Jan 17)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Rudy_D_Pereda (Jan 12)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Michael Brennen (Jan 12)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained R. DuFresne (Jan 13)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Michael Brennen (Jan 12)
(Thread continues...)
