Firewall Wizards mailing list archives
Host Based Packet Filters (was: OT: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained)
From: "Robin S. Socha" <robin-dated-1010506831.4920dd () socha net>
Date: Sat, 05 Jan 2002 12:15:33 -0500
* Roelof JT Jonkman <roel () SiliconDefense com> writes:
Internet security constantly boils down to risk assessment.
I presume you are talking of network security. The real problem is not some sorry Win2k luser losing his pr0n collection but large corporations losing confidential data. And risk assessment boils down to risk compensation. If you run a system whose security and data integrity you cannot guarantee because you do not have access to its source code, you have to calculate your losses in advance.
Tying a machine to the Internet regardless of how well secured is a risk, simply because IP is fundamentally not secure. It's just a matter of how much risk you care to expose yourself to. In general people are terrible at risk assessment when it comes to the Internet. (And propably dito in other areas too, but that's aside.)
Tune in again tomorrow when you hear Roelof JT Jonkman say "And this is how I r00t3d an OpenBSD box running djbdns and qmail". ;-) Yes, there is a risk. No, the risk is not evenly distributed. If you run well audited code from a trusted source, your risk is significantly lower. If you run opaque code from companies with a track record of total incompetence (nice glossy brochures, though, Sir, do you want the firewall painted blue or red?), well... There is a very wide gap between running OpenBSD/qmail and Win2k/Exchange. The web server risk assessment is quite simple if you base it on your favourite defacement mirror and Netcraft. If you decide to run software guaranteed to be broken, get a good insurance and a good lawyer and don't come whining. It's basically that simple.
The other major issue is that security is almost inherently user unfriendly, for your ordinary internet user security is an obstacle,
You're missing something there, Roelof. You seem to assume that everyone is running desktop computers with broken software. What is the risk for a user in a client/server environment if the server is well maintained and the backup strategy is good? What is unfriendly about running OpenBSD (I'm not shoving one Unix down everyone's throat, it's just that a) OpenBSD is a prime example of secure software and b) makes a good desktop system if you don't need MS Office).
hence people get highly inventive about avoiding and working around these obstacles. (avoid security, tunneling through chat/p2p network clients eg.)
And we're back to risk compensation. If you want to risk those nudy pix of your favourite inflatable sheep, that's fine: run ICQ; run Internet Explorer; run Outlook; allow attachments. But don't ever blame it on the internet - it's you, your taking unnecessary risks, and an OS vendor incapable of writing more than 10 lines of code with less than 5 buffer overflows.
Unless we as security professionals make security accessible for your average user Internet Security will be a utopia.
Define "security". Data integrity? System integrity? You can't guarantee those by adding things to your setup. You have to remove the broken parts.
I believe that one of not so recent developments of personal firewalls
Could we call these things by their proper name, please? They are host based packet filters. Some have content scanning abilities. They are not firewalls, though. A firewall IMVHO is a concept though.
has helped considerably in making security more accessible for an average Internet User.
Get real. Fast. Start here: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/3647 and here: http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/244026 (Flawed outbound packet filtering in various personal firewalls). When you're done with this, have some fun with Zone Alarm: ,----[ http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=3B3B7A4E.C2EF27C4%40hrz.tu-chemnitz.de ] | Code: | | Option Explicit | Private Declare Function CloseHandle Lib "kernel32" (ByVal hObject As Long) As Long | Private Declare Function TerminateProcess Lib "kernel32" (ByVal hProcess As Long, ByVal uExitCode As Long) As Long | Private Declare Function OpenProcess Lib "kernel32" (ByVal dwDesiredAccess As Long, ByVal bInheritHandle As Long, ByVal dwProcessId As Long) As Long | Const PROCESS_TERMINATE = &H1 | Private Declare Function GetWindowThreadProcessId Lib "user32" (ByVal hWnd As Long, lpdwProcessId As Long) As Long | Private Declare Function FindWindow Lib "user32" Alias "FindWindowA" (ByVal lpClassName As String, ByVal lpWindowName As String) As Long | | Private Sub Close_ZoneAlarm() | Dim xhwnd As Long | Dim pwid As Long | xhwnd = FindWindow(vbNullString, "ZoneAlarm") | GetWindowThreadProcessId xhwnd, pwid | Dim Task As Long, result As Long | Task = OpenProcess(PROCESS_TERMINATE, 0&, pwid) | TerminateProcess Task, 1& | CloseHandle Task | End Sub | | End Code `---- In case anyone ever had any doubts that Zone Alarm is broken beyond repair, this is the proof.
(I'm not quite sure, but is Microsoft shipping a personal firewall integrated with the latest windows incarnations?)
Let me ask you two questions, Roelof: 1. Why does OpenBSD's default install not have a "personal firewall" and still has not been broken into in 4 years? 2. How come Microsoft is *adding* code to its broken system instead of *removing* the broken code (hint: the answer to question one is the key to question 2)? You make it appear as if secure programming was impossible and only sprinkling some magic personal firewall dust can make a system secure. That, if you pardon my french, is bullshit. http://cr.yp.to/qmail/guarantee.html nicely wraps up the basic concepts of how to write secure code. Compare qmail to sendmail to Exchange - getting the drift? Then take a look at http://www.openbsd.org/security.html and compare OpenBSD to Linux to Win2k - see the similarity? Secure code is small, and modularized. Secure systems only have the functionality you need and nothing more. If you call this "user unfriendly", then you've made a risk assessment and decided for yourself that you believe in voodoo programming, fixing broken systems by adding obscure code and trusting companies with a track record that speaks for itself (if you consider root exploits "remote administration tools"). But don't make the mistake of presenting your version of the truth as an absolute truth. Because it is not. -- _______________________________________________ firewall-wizards mailing list firewall-wizards () nfr com http://list.nfr.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Current thread:
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Marcus J. Ranum (Jan 03)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Paul D. Robertson (Jan 04)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Richard Johnson (Jan 04)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Ryan Russell (Jan 05)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Frederick M Avolio (Jan 04)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Adam Shostack (Jan 04)
- RE: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained robert_david_graham (Jan 04)
- RE: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Ryan Russell (Jan 05)
- OT: Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Roelof JT Jonkman (Jan 05)
- Re: OT: Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained H. Morrow Long (Jan 06)
- Host Based Packet Filters (was: OT: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained) Robin S. Socha (Jan 06)
- safety of unidirectional NT trusts hermit921 (Jan 15)
- Re: safety of unidirectional NT trusts Jonas Anden (Jan 16)
- Re: safety of unidirectional NT trusts S. Jonah Pressman (Jan 17)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Rudy_D_Pereda (Jan 12)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Michael Brennen (Jan 12)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained R. DuFresne (Jan 13)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Michael Brennen (Jan 14)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained R. DuFresne (Jan 14)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Michael Brennen (Jan 15)
- Re: The Morris worm to Nimda, how little we've learned or gained Michael Brennen (Jan 12)
