Firewall Wizards mailing list archives

Re: tunnel vs open a hole


From: George Capehart <capegeo () opengroup org>
Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2003 18:43:58 -0400

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On Thursday 10 April 2003 09:24 pm, Duncan Sharp wrote:


<snip>  (I'm re-trying the reply to Duncan, the first time didn't make 
it through.  He has raised some questions/issues that I think deserve 
to be addressed . . .)

    In trying to better understand Risk, COBIT eliminated "Risk
Statements" from
    its Control Objectives in favor of "the pro-active approach
(objects are to be
    achieved) over the reactive approach (risks are to be
mitigated)".

I'm not sure that I understand what this statement means.  I can address 
the segment: "eliminated 'Risk Statements' from its Control 
Objectives," though.  In COBIT, 3rd Edition, High-level Control 
Objective PO9 is:  Assess Risks.  Under this high-level objective there 
are eight detailed objectives:

1. Business Risk Assessment
2. Risk Assessment Approach
3. Risk Identification
4. Risk Measurement
5. Risk Action Plan
6. Risk Acceptance
7. Safeguard Selection
8. Risk Assessment Commitment

(from the COBIT 3rd Edition Control Objectives, July 2000)

And in the 3rd Edition Audit Guidelines there is a whole section on 
evaluating how well those objectives are met.  Some of the things that 
are looked at/for are:

 - risk management ownership and accountability
 - different kinds of IT risks (technology, security, continuity,
   regulatory, etc.)
 - defined and communicated risk tolerance profile
 - root cause analyses and risk brainstorming sessions
 - quantitative and/or qualitative risk measurement
 - risk action plan
 - timely reassessment

So there are some "Risk Statements" left . . . and, IMHO, they do a 
reasonable job of evaluating the risk management process.


    Having just read some but not all, leaves me at "some risk" of
over simplification
    of stating some conclusion(s).

    In order to be blunt, they have some ideas on how to better
control IS systems,
    but don't hold them to it.

There is also a model for
accountability that I personally like (but at which everyone would
like to duck and run for cover) . . . see
http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/SP-800-37-v1.0.pdf (the certification
and accreditation process).  So there *does* exist a model for
oversight and a mechanism for accountability and assurance.  Just
can't figure out how to sell them.  Problem is, there is a
tremendous educational process that needs to happen before the
patients realize they're sick, and I haven't figured out how to
fund the process . . .  8-(  It gets back to Paul's analogy of the
IT department as the Electoral College, to which I subscribe, but
it's *still* an educational process . . .

    Which is good for governement IS systems, but what about private
sector
    IS systems?

Works very well for them, too.  At least in the instances with which I 
am familiar.  I just chose to reference the NIST document because I 
think it does a pretty good job of organizing and presenting the 
process.

BR
- -- 
George Capehart

PGP Key ID 63F0F642 at http://pgp.mit.edu

"Excuse of the day:  We're on Token Ring, and it looks like the
 token got loose."  -- BOfH
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