nanog mailing list archives

Re: Massive change in Public Cert behaviour coming soon


From: Christian de Larrinaga via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org>
Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 11:48:54 +0100

brent saner via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org> writes:

On Sat, May 17, 2025, 19:34 William Herrin via NANOG <nanog () lists nanog org>
wrote:

Does seem like it might have an impact on SMTP...


SMTPS/SMTP + STARTTLS for MTA <-> MTA does not use id-kp-clientAuth EKU,
which is what they're deprecating/removing. Certs are used on MTAs for
*identity verification of the server* and *integrity
validation/encryption*, not authentication.

It is strictly only used for *authenticating clients*, hence the name, in
mTLS (or *client*-driven one-way TLS, which I don't think I've ever
actually seen in the wild to my knowledge).

The only case this would matter is if you are using an MUA/sender/client
*authenticating* to an MTA with a certificate. 99.999% of email is one-way
server TLS, not mTLS. LE certs will continue to work fine for SMTP.


maybe this answers my questions. I am not sure. 

Is there any clear documenation of what is going on here? 



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Christian de Larrinaga 
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