Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH

[Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 () gmail com>]

On 9/25/25 14:38, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 9/24/25 23:51, Jacob Bachmeyer wrote:
> > On 9/24/25 06:45, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> > > Jacob Bachmeyer<jcb62281 () gmail com> writes:
> > >
> > > > The critical issue for exploiting Rowhammer to corrupt spilled register
> > > > values seems to be how long those spilled values remain live in DRAM before
> > > > they are reloaded into the register file and ultimately used.
> > > It also depends on whether they're ever actually read back from RAM or just
> > > end up sitting in cache for a microsecond or two before they're re-fetched
> > > from there.  There are some attacks that exploit the difference between
> > > (glitched) data in RAM and data in cache, but in this case it'd mitigate
> > > Rowhammer by having the corrupted data in RAM ignored if it's still in cache.
> > Indeed, if the spilled value is never evicted from cache, then it is
> > never live in DRAM and Rowhammer cannot be used to corrupt it. However,
> > if I understand correctly, modern systems aggressively flush caches on
> > process context switches in order to close cache-related side channels.
> >
> > This seems to suggest that the solution to "Rowhammer Mayhem" may lie in
> > improvements to kernel scheduler and VM management subsystems.
> What about hardware fixes?  Those will take a long time
> to roll out but hopefully they can be 100% effective.

First, that does absolutely nothing for current hardware. Declaring all 
(or almost all) current hardware e-waste is severely environmentally 
irresponsible if it can possibly be avoided.

Second, I had expected ECC to "kill Rowhammer dead" only to find that it 
can be possible to cause enough bit flips to get all the way from one 
valid ECC word to another valid ECC word before ECC scrub reaches the 
location.  I suspect that the DDR5 built-in ECC is supposed to resolve 
Rowhammer, but we will have to wait and see if it actually achieves that 
goal.

It seems highly likely that Rowhammer is an inherent consequence of DRAM 
density beyond a certain limit and highly *unlikely* that reducing DRAM 
density below the "Rowhammer threshold" will prove to be an acceptable 
solution.

> > Perhaps a yield primitive that yields the rest of the current timeslice
> > but guarantees a full unpreemptable timeslice upon resume?  That would
> > allow a brief sensitive computation to be effectively made
> > uninterruptible but would not permit monopolization of the processor.
> >
> > Perhaps more randomization in assigning physical page frames to prevent
> > the kernel from reliably using "bait" pages?  The attack in the paper
> > seems to depend on predictable page frame allocation.
> >
> > The latter could also be implemented in user processes:  allocate a
> > randomly-sized pad on the stack to shift "inner" stack variables away
> > from their predictable locations.  Making the pad multiple pages plus a
> > fraction of a page could also counter predictable kernel page frame
> > allocations by shifting the sequence of pages allocated.
> One idea I had is to add physical guard pages
> between uses of memory for different purposes.

That depends on assumptions about physical layout that may not hold.  
(What if the DRAM is interleaved such that the guard pages end up in a 
different bank or chip?)  Apparently the researchers already had to hit 
areas at some logical distance from the target; I doubt that the exact 
physical DRAM layout in the chips they used is published.

Worse, skipping page frames like this may work for one DRAM density and 
silently fail for another, or even between two different chips with the 
same density but different internal layouts, or even between identical 
hardware that has different memory controller configurations for some 
reason.


The stack is intrinsically aligned on much finer than page granularity; 
introducing additional "jitter" to the locations of stack variables (and 
spilled registers) is a solution available today with minimal cost.  All 
you need is "size_t slide_size=random_stack_slide_size(); void * 
slide=alloca(slide_size); memset(slide,0,slide_size);" near the top of 
main (and possibly other functions to "mix it up" more) and a function 
random_stack_slide_size() that gives an appropriate unpredictable value.

The key is to avoid trying to prevent bits from being flipped (that 
proverbial ship has sailed on current hardware) but instead prevent an 
attacker from being able to predict accomplishing something useful with 
those bit-flips.


-- Jacob