
oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH
From: Jacob Bachmeyer <jcb62281 () gmail com>
Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2025 19:06:18 -0500
On 9/26/25 09:19, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
On 9/25/25 22:33, Jacob Bachmeyer wrote: [...]It seems highly likely that Rowhammer is an inherent consequence of DRAM density beyond a certain limit and highly *unlikely* that reducing DRAM density below the "Rowhammer threshold" will prove to be an acceptable solution.See https://arxiv.org/pdf/2407.09995 for the proper solution: store a per-row activation counter alongside the row itself, and when any row in a bank exceeds the threshold, take action.
I am somewhat skeptical about this, simply because there have been many "proper solutions" to Rowhammer that have thus far failed.
[...] The stack is intrinsically aligned on much finer than page granularity; introducing additional "jitter" to the locations of stack variables (and spilled registers) is a solution available today with minimal cost. All you need is "size_t slide_size=random_stack_slide_size(); void * slide=alloca(slide_size); memset(slide,0,slide_size);" near the top of main (and possibly other functions to "mix it up" more) and a function random_stack_slide_size() that gives an appropriate unpredictable value. The key is to avoid trying to prevent bits from being flipped (that proverbial ship has sailed on current hardware) but instead prevent an attacker from being able to predict accomplishing something useful with those bit-flips.I suspect that in general this is provably impossible.
You suspect that ASLR is generally provably useless? "Sliding" the stack is the same basic principle as ASLR.
The "Rowhammer Mayhem" attack evades ASLR by exploiting the kernel's physical page allocation policy, effectively converting the significant address to an ordinal page number ("Nth page allocated") and offset instead of a virtual or physical address.
My hope is that EU regulations like CRA and PLD will force hardware recalls when defects like Rowhammer are detected.
You realize that legal cudgels like that could very well kill the entire computing industry if it turns out that Rowhammer is due to physical limitations, right?
-- Jacob
Current thread:
- Re: process exit statuses (was: CVE-2023-51767), (continued)
- Re: process exit statuses (was: CVE-2023-51767) Simon McVittie (Sep 23)
- Re: CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Peter Gutmann (Sep 23)
- Re: CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Todd C. Miller (Sep 23)
- Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Adiletta, Andrew (Sep 23)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Jacob Bachmeyer (Sep 23)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Peter Gutmann (Sep 24)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Jacob Bachmeyer (Sep 24)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Demi Marie Obenour (Sep 25)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Jacob Bachmeyer (Sep 25)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Demi Marie Obenour (Sep 26)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Jacob Bachmeyer (Sep 27)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Demi Marie Obenour (Sep 27)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Jacob Bachmeyer (Sep 27)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Peter Gutmann (Sep 27)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Demi Marie Obenour (Sep 27)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Peter Gutmann (Sep 27)
- Re: Re: [EXT] Re: [oss-security] CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Demi Marie Obenour (Sep 27)
- Re: CVE-2023-51767: a bogus CVE in OpenSSH Damien Miller (Sep 24)